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NONMARRIAGE 
JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN* 
 Now that the Supreme Court has reshaped the laws of marriage, 
attention is shifting to nonmarriage.  The law no longer treats in-
timate couples who do not marry as either deviant or deprived.  
Yet, rather than regulate nonmarriage in a systematic way, the law 
applies two inconsistent doctrines to govern these relationships.  
This Article is the first to explore the fundamental contradiction in 
the legal approach to unmarried partners. While the laws govern-
ing financial obligations between unmarried couples are moving 
toward a deregulatory model that radically differs from the status-
based regulation of marriage, the laws of custody and support in-
sist on imposing normative obligations identical to those involved 
in marriage, whatever the actual arrangement between the parties.  
This Article provides a new theory for the current legal regulation 
of nonmarriage.   
 This Article examines the different trajectories of the two bodies 
of law—financial and custodial obligations—that underlie the le-
gal treatment of nonmarriage.  It shows how the financial law of 
nonmarriage reflects women’s growing economic independence 
and the deregulation of adult relationships.  By contrast, custody 
and support law are rooted in an older view of parental obligations 
that is contrary to emerging community norms about unmarried 
parenting.  Consequently, as this Article shows, the laws of mar-
riage, which envision a single coherent institution, are an inappro-
priate model for the laws of nonmarriage.  Finally, this Article ar-
ticulates a framework to provide a coherent legal approach to 
nonmarriage.  As marriage—and nonmarriage—become true 
choices, it will be increasingly important to address what full legal 
respect for these choices entails.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
With the Supreme Court’s embrace of marriage equality in cases from 
Loving v. Virginia1 to Obergefell v. Hodges,2 the looming issue for contem-
porary families is nonmarriage: how should the law respond to the increasing 
numbers of couples who could marry, but choose not to?  Existing legal reg-
ulation of nonmarriage combines two contradictory approaches.  It accepts 
the autonomy of such couples with respect to financial matters and imposes 
almost no obligations without either an express agreement or evidence of 
combined assets.  Yet, with respect to childrearing, the law ignores the par-
ties’ arrangements and instead imposes obligations comparable to those ap-
                                                          
 1.  388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 2.  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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plicable to married couples.  These opposing approaches, which reflect en-
tirely different conceptions of what nonmarriage means, block the emergence 
of a more coherent system for regulating unmarried relationships.3 
The first approach embraces couples’ autonomy in electing terms suita-
ble to their individual relationships.  It allows cohabitants to enter into con-
tracts, manage their estates, and adopt each other’s children.4  Courts that 
apply this approach stop short of implying any broader commitments from 
the existence of an unmarried intimate relationship itself.  Indeed, relatively 
few states are willing to imply an agreement, impose a duty to share property, 
or provide continued support from the fact of cohabitation alone.5  Instead, 
the courts take their lead from the parties’ formal agreements and their ac-
tions in commingling their assets.  As though they were dealing with business 
partnerships, the courts unwind the parties’ financial entanglements in ac-
cordance with express contract terms and the law of unjust enrichment.6  In 
the process, the law withholds judgment about the relationship itself.  It no 
longer condemns, but it also does not guide the status of nonmarriage, leaving 
the parties room to craft relationships of their choice.7 
                                                          
 3.  See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital 
Recognition and Its Relationship to Marriage, 102 CAL. L. REV. 87 (2014) (showing how marriage 
shaped advocacy for recognizing LGBT relational rights).  While there are many discussions of 
cohabitation, most emphasize the ways the law fails to extend marriage-like provisions to the un-
married and propose that the law extend similar treatment to both.  See, e.g., CYNTHIA GRANT 
BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY (2010).  Alternatively, those oppos-
ing equal treatment of married and unmarried couples tend to emphasize the continuing importance 
(and superiority) of marriage.  See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revo-
lution and Legal Regulation, 42 FAM. L.Q. 309, 315–22 (2008) [hereinafter Garrison, Nonmarital 
Cohabitation].  For other articles addressing some of the differences between marriage and non-
marriage, see Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?  An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of 
Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815 (2005) [hereinafter Garrison, Consent] (discussing 
the importance of consent); Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, Cohabitation and the Restatement 
(Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1407, 1419–24 (2011); 
Melissa Murray, Accommodating Nonmarriage, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 661 (2015) (exploring how to 
conceptualize alternatives to traditional intimate couple relationships). 
 4.  See, e.g., William N. Eskridge Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of 
Menus, Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1929 (2012).  Illinois, for example, 
does not recognize rights between cohabitants “to enforce mutual property rights where those rights 
are rooted in a marriage-like relationship.”  Blumenthal v. Brewer, No. 118781, slip op. at 4 (Ill. 
filed Aug. 18, 2016); see also Gregg Strauss, Why the State Cannot “Abolish Marriage”: A Partial 
Defense of Legal Marriage, 90 IND. L.J. 1261, 1278 (2015).  
 5.  The Illinois Supreme Court, for example, which had been expected to expand the remedies 
available to unmarried couples, chose not to do so.  See Blumenthal, slip op at 29.  
 6.  See, e.g., Cates v. Swain, No. 2010–CT–01939–SCT, 2013 WL 1831783, at *2 (Miss. May 
2, 2013) (en banc). 
 7.  See DOUGLAS ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 249–94 (4th ed. 2015) 
(tracing the history of legal approaches to nonmarital relationships).  The American Law Institute’s 
Principles of Family Dissolution (“ALI Principles”) and the state of Washington set out guidance 
for when economic rights accrue in nonmarital relationships.  PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY 
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2002) [hereinafter ALI 
PRINCIPLES]; see also Olver v. Fowler, 168 P.3d 348, 355 (Wash. 2007).  This provision of the ALI, 
Principles however, has been soundly criticized, and the provision has not been widely adopted.  
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The second approach to nonmarriage is typically applied to parenting 
issues.  It rejects the couples’ autonomy by ignoring their own parenting 
agreements and understandings.  Instead, the law imposes custody and sup-
port terms indistinguishable from those it applies to married parents at di-
vorce, terms that impose equal rights and responsibilities on both parents.  
Yet, many parents do not marry precisely because they do not want such 
terms, or they feel, often with good reason, that the other parent is not willing 
or capable of equally sharing responsibilities.  Consequently, courts increas-
ingly impose such shared parenting arrangements on couples who barely 
know each other, disagree fundamentally on how to parent, and often cannot 
stand to be in the same room together; or, even if they cooperate perfectly 
well, they have simply elected that their co-parenting relationship consist of 
different terms from those the law would ordinarily impose.  These custodial 
and support terms, which reflect the norms that married couples are expected 
to internalize, are at odds with the circumstances more typical of unmarried 
relationships. 
This Article is the first to examine the contradictions between these two 
bodies of law and consider their implications for the meaning of nonmarriage 
as a distinct status.  It documents how the laws governing financial obliga-
tions are moving toward a deregulatory model that differs radically from the 
status-based regulation of marriage at the same time that custody and support 
standards impose normative obligations identical to those involved in mar-
riage.  It explains that the law that governs financial matters has evolved to 
reflect women’s increasing economic independence, and refuses to insist on 
protection for those made vulnerable by cohabitation.  It contrasts these de-
velopments with the law that governs custody and support.  The law that gov-
erns nonmarital children, however, remains rooted in an older view of paren-
tal relationships, and does not reflect emerging community norms about 
unmarried parenting.  To the extent it recognizes the parties’ individual un-
derstandings at all, it is often disdainful of them.  And, unlike the financial 
treatment of nonmarriage, it does not create space for the couples’ varying 
expectations about what it means to raise a child together without marrying. 
While the law that governs property and the law that governs children 
are often distinct, we argue that the failure to consider these two approaches 
together prevents the emergence of a more unified approach to nonmarriage.  
Both groups of cases have one thing in common: the couples have very in-
tentionally said “no” to marriage because they did not want the commitments 
marriage entails.  We conclude that these decisions should be taken seriously, 
and that the time has come to consider “nonmarriage” as a distinct body of 
law on its own terms.  Doing so requires acknowledging the full continuum 
                                                          
See Garrison, Consent, supra note 3 (criticizing ALI Principles because of the failure to require 
consent to assumption of nonmarital obligations).   
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of nonmarital relationships and bringing coherence to the two bodies of non-
marriage law.  In Part I, the Article traces the different trajectories of the two 
bodies of law—financial and parental obligations—that underlie the legal 
treatment of nonmarriage and argues that these two distinct regulatory ap-
proaches are on a collision course, defeating a coherent legal approach to 
nonmarriage.  
In Part II, the Article analyzes changes in the law of marriage.  Over the 
past half-century, marriage has been transformed from an institution prem-
ised on inequality to one that enshrines equality.  This commitment to formal 
equality has made financial interdependence, with a presumptive fifty/fifty 
division of marital assets, and shared parenting, with many states seeking to 
maximize the time the children spend with both parents, the hallmarks of the 
remade institution of marriage.  As a result, marriage today requires high de-
grees of commitment, maturity, and trust.  It is, accordingly, not for everyone. 
In Part III, the Article sets out three critical differences that frame the 
choice not to marry, exploring legal distinctions as well as providing a soci-
ological and demographic context.  The rate of cohabitation is almost nine 
times higher today than it was in the 1960s, and most new marriages begin 
as cohabitations.8  Approximately one out of every five children are born to 
cohabiting, nonmarried couples.  Some of these relationships involve pro-
found commitments equivalent in every respect to the strongest marriages—
except state sanction.  Others involve no more than a casual affair or a co-
habitation of convenience.  Most do not involve either financial interdepend-
ence or, if there are children at all, equally shared parenting.  Unlike marriage, 
these nonmarriages do not involve any single set of shared meanings.  In-
stead, emerging community norms reflect varying expectations about what 
such relationships entail. 
The Article concludes that for the law to fully embrace nonmarriage, it 
must find ways to protect autonomy and to allow recognition of the contin-
uum of relationships of the unmarried.  The imposition of formal equality in 
these circumstances disrupts the terms the parties have chosen for them-
selves, alters the nature of their relationships, and threatens to create instabil-
ity for children.  Paradoxically, therefore, imposing equality fosters inequal-
ity.  To that end, default principles should attempt not to mimic marital 
relationships, but to reflect the terms couples might, and do, choose on their 
own. 
                                                          
 8.  Arielle Kuperberg, Does Premarital Cohabitation Raise Your Risk of Divorce?, COUNCIL 
ON CONTEMPORARY FAMILIES (Mar. 10, 2014), https://contemporaryfamilies.org/cohabitation-di-
vorce-brief-report/. 
CarboneCahnFinalBookProof 10/31/2016  3:22 PM 
60 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:55 
I.  THE IRONIES OF NONMARRIAGE 
Marriage law has long served to institutionalize expectations about ap-
propriate conduct9 by reinforcing broadly shared community norms and 
“channeling” intimate relationships into marriage.10  The purpose of the con-
temporary law of nonmarriage, on the other hand, is a subject of intense dis-
pute. 
Many scholars advocate greater recognition of nonmarital relationships 
in order to increase individual autonomy and pluralism; these scholars argue 
that individuals should be free to enter into relationships of their choice,11 at 
least so long as the relationships do not involve the imposition of harm on 
others.12  Other scholars advocate greater recognition of unmarried relation-
ships because they are concerned about the potential for exploitation in the 
absence of regulation; some cohabitants, for example, commingle their lives 
over time in ways that may leave one partner more vulnerable than the other 
at the time of a break-up.13  As many scholars have observed, however, there 
is a difference between justifying legal intervention on the basis of the par-
ties’ presumed agreements (partners who have lived together for a certain 
period of time can be presumed to have agreed to take care each other, unless 
they specify otherwise), versus doing so on the basis of a societally imposed 
moral obligation (partners who have lived together for a certain period of 
                                                          
 9.  See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From Contract to Status: Collaboration 
and the Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 293, 313 (2015) (“[M]ar-
riage is embedded in informal social norms that prescribe expectations for spousal behavior and 
underscore its nature as a family relationship defined by long-term commitment.  These norms are 
internalized, thereby reinforcing trust, and are also enforced externally through informal sanc-
tions.”). 
 10.  See Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495 
(1992).   
 11.  See Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1890 (arguing for a broad menu of options that simultane-
ously increases and guides choices in the creation of family relationships); Shahar Lifshitz, Married 
Against Their Will? Toward a Pluralist Regulation of Spousal Relationships, 66 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1565, 1589–1601 (2009) (arguing for family pluralism as valuable in itself and challenging 
the imposition of mandatory obligations on cohabitants).  
 12.  The clearest examples of harm involve predatory or exploitative relationships such as un-
derage marriages.  The more controversial examples involve the continuing prohibitions on polyg-
amous relationships.  See, e.g., Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, 
and Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2018 (2010) (suggesting a regulation based 
on the partnership model to police the potential for abuse in polygamous relationships). 
 13.  The highest profile cases, such as Marvin v. Marvin, often involve such disparities.  557 
P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (Michelle Marvin was a lounge singer, while Lee Marvin was a movie star).  
And, a few scholars still oppose all recognition.  See Lynn D. Wardle, The “Constitution” of Mar-
riage, and the “Constitutions” of Nations, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 437, 464 (2010) (explaining that in-
creasing rates of nonmarital cohabitation “create serious challenges to the integrity of many mar-
riages and families and threaten heartache and deprivation”).   
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time have assumed an obligation to take care of each other, whether or not 
they would prefer otherwise).14 
In addition, legal decisions, whether they impose or reject such obliga-
tions, influence community expectations.  They make cohabitation—and the 
practices associated with it—more visible.  This increased visibility encour-
ages couples to make more conscious choices about their relationships in 
light of the court decisions, further contributing to the development of com-
munity norms.  In some cases, the community norms lead to shared expecta-
tions, such as the expectation that cohabitation without marriage involves no 
obligation to share an inheritance, while at other times, it leads to more care-
fully framed choices, such as the need for unmarried couples to consider 
whether to title their shared residence as a joint tenancy or a tenancy in com-
mon.  And the evolving community standards may in turn influence the law.15 
Full legal recognition of nonmarriage accordingly requires engaging in 
the process of norm creation.  Those scholars who advocate for treating mar-
riage and nonmarriage on equal terms typically favor developing substantive 
expectations about the content of nonmarriage.16  Yet, it is difficult to do jus-
tice to the variety of nonmarital cohabitations; one size does not fit all.17  This 
Part will explore these contradictions through two Sections that compare the 
law that addresses financial obligations with the law that governs custody.  It 
concludes that these two bodies of law reflect conflicting approaches to non-
marital status, and block the emergence of a more coherent and unified body 
of law. 
A.  Nonmarriage and Financial Independence 
The cases most associated with recognizing nonmarriage as a distinct 
status involve financial obligations, and the early cases involved women who, 
                                                          
 14.  See Ira Mark Ellman, “Contract Thinking” Was Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1365, 1367–69 (2001); see also Garrison, Consent, supra note 3 (noting similar problems). 
 15.  See Scott & Scott, supra note 9, at 340–42 (calling this an “iterative process”); see also 
Naomi Cahn, The New Kinship, 100 GEO. L.J. 367, 406 (2012) (noting the interactive effect of law 
and behavior); Katherine M. Franke, Commentary, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 
104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1419 (2004) (questioning the privileging of behavior through legal 
recognition); Clare Huntington, Familial Norms and Normality, 59 EMORY L.J. 1103, 1156–59 
(2010); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 338, 340 (1997) (defining norms as informal social and cultural expectations with which peo-
ple feel they must comply).  
 16.  Ellman, supra note 14, at 1367 (favoring support obligations); Clare Huntington, Postmar-
ital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167, 240 (2015) 
(favoring greater emphasis on shared custody for unmarried couples). 
 17.  Indeed, the reported cases are systematically different from typical cohabitation cases in 
ways that skew any process of norm development, and raise concerns about the use of such norms 
to define the legal obligations of nonmarriage more generally.  They do not conform to “ordinary 
cohabitation.”  See J. Herbie DiFonzo, How Marriage Became Optional: Cohabitation, Gender, 
and the Emerging Functional Norms, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 521 (2011); Ann Laquer Estin, 
Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381, 1401–08 (2001). 
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over the course of the cohabitation, became dependent on the financial sup-
port of their wealthy male partners.18  The case that thrust legal recognition 
of cohabitation into public consciousness was Marvin v. Marvin,19 a case in-
volving a famous actor at the height of his career and a Hollywood starlet.  
Before Marvin, courts typically rejected claims for support between cohabit-
ants; a woman who lived with a man without a ring on her finger was both 
stigmatized and pitied as a fool, who should have known better than to rely 
on a man’s promises.20  Moreover, before Marvin, the enforceability of such 
agreements, even if explicit, was questionable to the extent that a contract for 
a women’s domestic services in exchange for a man’s support was presumed 
to be premised on sex as consideration for the agreement.21 
In Marvin, the California Supreme Court held that unmarried couples 
could contract between themselves and those contracts would be enforcea-
ble.22  The Court rejected only those contracts where sex was the express 
purpose of the contract.23  Marvin and its progeny24 helped ratify recognition 
of nonmarriage as a distinct relationship and remove some of the stigma as-
sociated with nonmarital sexuality.25 
                                                          
 18.  See, e.g., In re Estate of Roccamonte, 808 A.2d 838, 845 (N.J. 2002), superseded by statute 
on other grounds, Act of Jan. 18, 2010, ch. 311, 2009 N.J. Laws 2322 (codified at N.J. STAT. § 25:1-
5(h) (2015)). 
 19.  557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). 
 20.  See, e.g., Beckman v. Mayhew, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604, 608 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (pre-Marvin 
case rejecting claim for support on the basis of domestic services provided in the context of a non-
marital cohabitation).  Not all courts, however, accepted the Marvin reasoning.  E.g., Hewitt v. 
Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979) (post-Marvin). 
 21.  See Marvin, 557 P.2d at 112.  The Marvin court also observed that earlier decisions “rested 
upon a policy of punishing persons guilty of cohabitation without marriage.”  Id. at 119.  
 22.  Id. at 122. 
 23.  The court stated that this type of agreement, “even if expressly made in contemplation of 
a common living arrangement, is invalid only if sexual acts form an inseparable part of the consid-
eration for the agreement.”  Id. at 114.  Instead, “any severable portion of the contract supported by 
independent consideration will still be enforced.”  Id.; cf. Pizzo v. Goor, 857 N.Y.S.2d 526, 526 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (adjudicating a constructive trust claim dismissed even in face of an express 
“promise to pay . . . at the end of their cohabitation” because the main consideration was the provi-
sion of companionship, both sexual and platonic). 
 24.  E.g., Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902, 906 (N.J. 1979); Garrison, Nonmarital Co-
habitation, supra note 3, at 315 (pointing out that Marvin has been cited approximately 200 times 
by other courts, and it represents “the dominant approach to cohabitant claims”). 
 25.  The Marvin Court concluded that: 
[W]e base our opinion on the principle that adults who voluntarily live together and en-
gage in sexual relations are nonetheless as competent as any other persons to contract 
respecting their earnings and property rights. . . .  [T]hey may agree to pool their earnings 
and to hold all property acquired during the relationship in accord with the law governing 
community property; conversely they may agree that each partner’s earnings and the 
property acquired from those earnings remains the separate property of the earning part-
ner.  So long as the agreement does not rest upon illicit meretricious consideration, the 
parties may order their economic affairs as they choose, and no policy precludes the 
courts from enforcing such agreements. 
Marvin, 557 P.2d at 116.  
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But Marvin, and the cases that followed, also raised a potentially more 
radical claim; one that if fully implemented would have changed the norms 
as well as the power balance that attended unmarried relationships.  This sec-
ond claim suggested not only that parties could enter into contractual rela-
tionships if they so chose, but also that such voluntary agreements should be 
presumed from the circumstances of the parties’ arrangements.26  That is, if 
a couple entered into an arrangement in which the party with the higher in-
come provided support while the other party attended to the couple’s house-
hold needs, the higher earning party would be presumed to have agreed to 
support the other party for a period beyond the end of the relationship.27  This 
latter allegation, couched in the language of implied contract, assumes a 
moral obligation.  It suggests that where, as in the Marvin case, the higher 
earner accepts the contributions of the other party, he can be presumed to 
have agreed to provide compensation, either because the other party acted in 
reliance on such an implied promise (by, for example, quitting her own job 
or failing to develop other sources of income), or because the higher earner 
received the benefits of services from the other party without providing full 
compensation for them. 
Marvin, however, while clearly upholding the principle that the parties 
could reach any agreement they wanted, did not ultimately conclude that Lee 
Marvin had made any such promise or entered into any such agreement.  Nor 
did the court find that the mere fact of a traditional relationship between a 
higher earning partner and one who gave up other opportunities to contribute 
to household management gave rise to an agreement implied in either fact or 
law to provide compensation.28  Instead, the case and later developments in 
the law of nonmarriage have extended greater recognition of such relation-
ships and increased the autonomy of nonmarital cohabitants to enter into 
terms of their choosing, without addressing the balance between them that 
typically gives more power to the person with the greater income.29  In short, 
                                                          
 26.  Id. at 122 (allowing the courts to “inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine 
whether that conduct demonstrates an implied contract or implied agreement of partnership or joint 
venture, or some other tacit understanding between the parties”).  The court also allowed a nonmar-
ital partner to “recover in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of household services rendered 
less the reasonable value of support received if he can show that he rendered services with the 
expectation of monetary reward.”  Id. at 122–23. 
 27.  Or, according to the ALI Principles, the higher earning party would be subject to such an 
obligation even without an agreement.  This provision, however, has been the subject of considera-
ble objection.  See Garrison, Consent, supra note 3, at 819–21 (criticizing ALI Principles because 
of the failure to require consent to assumption of nonmarital obligations). 
 28.  Michelle Marvin never received any compensation after her relationship with Lee Marvin.  
See ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 7, at 258.  
 29.  Ellman, supra note 14. 
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the law increased recognition of such relationships without regulating, mon-
itoring, or encouraging them.30 
Where courts have imposed obligations on nonmarital partners, it has 
done so by extending unjust enrichment claims to property ownership.31  
These cases typically involve relatively sophisticated parties, who, in the con-
text of longer-term relationships, commingle their financial assets.  Courts 
have recognized the need to oversee the division of assets at the termination 
of the relationship, without becoming involved in the relationship terms 
themselves. 
In Cates v. Swain,32 for example, the Mississippi Supreme Court, in a 
2013 en banc decision, acknowledged the right of a same-sex cohabitant to 
seek unjust enrichment for her contributions to property held in her partner’s 
name.  The court distinguished earlier rulings rejecting such claims between 
different-sex intimate partnerships, emphasizing that the earlier cases based 
their claims on the nature of the relationships.33  In Cates, the court charac-
terized the claim as one based on a right of recovery of “readily identifiable 
assets (or tangible benefits),” acquired through an understanding of shared 
ownership and possession.34  The court observed that it was quite consciously 
not using the legal claim of unjust enrichment as “a roving mandate [for a 
court] to sort through terminated personal relationships in an attempt to 
nicely judge and balance the respective contributions of the parties.”35  In-
stead, the court distinguished the need to provide recompense for one party’s 
monetary contributions (the acquisition of a house titled only in the other 
party’s name), from what it termed the “momentous task” of parsing the 
terms of the relationship itself.36 
Illinois, which seemed similarly poised to overturn its long-standing re-
fusal to grant relief to unmarried couples, decided not to do so.37  In Blumen-
thal v. Brewer,38 the Illinois Court of Appeals addressed a relationship be-
tween two women, a doctor and a lawyer, who had lived together for twenty-
six years and raised three children together.39  Throughout most of the period, 
                                                          
 30.  See Scott & Scott, supra note 9 (discussing the law’s role in monitoring unconventional 
relationships). 
 31.  Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 3.  
 32.  No. 2010–CT–01939–SCT, 2013 WL 1831783, at *5 (Miss. May 2, 2013) (en banc). 
 33.  E.g., id. at *3 (noting that in earlier cases, “the aggrieved party’s claim for recovery was 
based upon a relationship”). 
 34.  Id. at *4.  
 35.  Id. (quoting Slocum v. Hammond, 346 N.W.2d 485, 491–92 (Iowa 1984)).  
 36.  Id. 
 37.  See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979) (discussing Marvin but denying judicial 
recognition of “mutually enforceable property rights to knowingly unmarried cohabitants”).  
 38.  24 N.E.3d 168 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014), appeal granted, 31 N.E.3d 767 (Ill. 2015). 
 39.  Id. at 170.  
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the couple could not marry; yet, they had a relationship essentially indistin-
guishable from a fully committed, financially interdependent marriage. 
The court of appeals overturned the trial court’s dismissal of the case, 
observing that “the public policy to treat unmarried partnerships as illicit no 
longer exists,”40 but the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, upholding its earlier 
precedents.41  As in Cates v. Swain, the Illinois Supreme Court distinguished 
between claims that arose from the basis of the relationship, that is, the par-
ties’ living in a marriage-like relationship42 versus claims arising from dis-
tinct contributions by each to property acquisition.43  The court emphasized 
that the state’s continuing interest in distinguishing between marital and non-
marital relationships, and the importance of preventing “marriage from be-
coming in effect a private contract terminable at will, by disfavoring the grant 
of mutually enforceable property rights to knowingly unmarried cohabit-
ants.”44  While the decision’s refusal to recognize claims arising from the fact 
of the intimate relationship itself is consistent with cases from other jurisdic-
tions,45 the strength of the policy echoes the California Supreme Court’s 
statement in Marvin: that a court’s decision on claims brought by unmarried 
cohabitants did not in any way undercut the strong state policy supporting 
marriage. 
A few states initially took a broader approach toward nonmarital obli-
gations, in which they seemed to recognize grounds for support on the basis 
of a gendered assumption of responsibilities during cohabitation, but most of 
these states have subsequently narrowed these doctrines,46 typically distin-
guishing between property claims and claims for support.  The New Jersey 
Supreme Court, for example, had awarded permanent support based on an 
                                                          
 40.  Id. at 174. 
 41.  See Blumenthal v. Brewer, No. 118781, slip op. at 29 (Ill. filed Aug. 18, 2016).  The court 
found that:  
[T]he current legislative and judicial trend is to uphold the institution of marriage.  Most 
notably, within the past year, the United States Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, 
held that same-sex couples cannot be denied the right to marry.  In doing so, the Court 
found that “new insights [from the developments in the institution of marriage over the 
past centuries] have strengthened, not weakened, the institution of marriage.” 
Id. at 26 (citation omitted) (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015)). 
 42.  No. 2010–CT–01939–SCT, 2013 WL 1831783 (Miss. May 2, 2013), at *3 (en banc).  See, 
for example, the court’s point that “[t]he decision between Blumenthal and Brewer to commingle 
their finances and use those joint funds to make property and financial investments demonstrates 
that the funds were economically dependent on the parties’ marriage-like relationship.”  Blumenthal, 
slip op. at 22.  
 43.  See, e.g., id. at 23 (referring to the requirement of “an independent economic basis apart 
from the parties’ relationship” as prerequisite for a claim of restitution).  
 44.  Id. at 27. 
 45.  See, e.g., Cates, 2013 WL 1831783, at *3–5. 
 46.  See, e.g., Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 313–14 (Wis. 1987); cf. Waage v. Borer, 525 
N.W.2d 96, 98 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that Wisconsin “does not recognize recompense for 
housekeeping or other services unless the services are linked to an accumulation of wealth or assets 
during the relationship”). 
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oral promise between partners who did not even cohabit, but the legislature 
then limited such claims to those based on written agreements.47  The highest 
court of West Virginia also recognized broad equity jurisdiction to untangle 
the financial affairs of long-term cohabitants, but later limited the precedent 
to property matters rather than support.48 
The state of Washington similarly extended its community property re-
gime to unmarried partners engaged in what it initially termed a “meretri-
cious” relationship, and now deems a “committed intimate relationship.”49  It 
defined meretricious relationships as “stable relationships evidenced by such 
factors as continuous cohabitation, duration of the relationship, purpose of 
the relationship, pooling of resources and services for mutual benefit, and the 
intent of the parties.”50  Despite this relatively expansive definition, Wash-
ington courts have nevertheless refused to extend this doctrine to couples en-
gaged in less “marriage-like” cohabitations, looking not only for evidence of 
exclusivity in the intimate character of the relationship, but also a pooling of 
resources giving rise to the need for an equitable division of property.51 
The most ambitious effort to recognize broad obligations among cohab-
itants came from the American Law Institute’s Principles of Family Dissolu-
tion (ALI Principles).52  The ALI Principles effectively make the same rem-
edies available following the dissolution of a cohabitation as a marriage, but 
the provision subjecting domestic partners and married couples to the same 
equitable division and alimony rules have not been fully adopted by any 
state.53  And some states remain reluctant to recognize actions by unmarried 
couples against each other at all, not because of a refusal to recognize the 
                                                          
 47.  See In re Estate of Roccamonte, 808 A.2d 838, 845 (N.J. 2002), superseded by statute, N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 25:1-5h (2016). 
 48.  West Virginia permits property division between unmarried cohabitants “who have con-
sidered themselves and held themselves out to be husband and wife,” looking at factors such as “the 
purpose, duration, and stability of the relationship and the expectations of the parties.”  Goode v. 
Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430, 438 (W. Va. 1990).  But see Thomas v. LaRosa, 400 S.E.2d 809 (W. Va. 
1990) (rejecting claim of support). 
 49.  Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (using “meretricious relation-
ship” terminology); see also In re Kelly & Moesslang, 287 P.3d 12, 16–19 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) 
(applying a three-year statute of limitations to claims based on a “committed intimate relationship” 
by analogizing such claims to those arising out of contracts or other liabilities not established by 
writing). 
 50.  In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d 764, 770 (2000) (en banc) (citing Connell v. Fran-
cisco, 898 P.2d 831, 834 (Wash. 1995) (en banc)). 
 51.  Id. at 773.  
 52.  ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, § 6. 
 53.  Strauss, supra note 4, at 1280 (noting that the ALI Principles have created controversy and 
that the provisions addressing the property distribution between unmarried partners have not been 
adopted by any state); see also Garrison, Consent, supra note 3 (criticizing ALI Principles because 
of the failure to require consent to assumption of nonmarital obligations). 
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relationship, but due to a wariness of becoming entangled in the substance of 
the claims.54 
While the states continue to vary in their willingness to address claims 
arising from nonmarital cohabitation, the majority of jurisdictions appear to 
be influenced by two factors.  First, consistent with the greater willingness to 
recognize nonmarital relationships, courts are willing to untangle ownership 
of assets.  This is likely because the process involves familiar and determinate 
concepts, and courts apply these concepts in the context of other types of 
relationships.55  Second, as a general rule, courts have not engaged the nor-
mative question of what partners owe each other.  Therefore, they most em-
phatically have not treated unmarried cohabitants equally with married cou-
ples who are seen as promising each other a duty of support and who stand 
in a fiduciary obligation with respect to each other.56 
A 2013 Hawaii case illustrates these principles.  In Simmons v. Samu-
lewicz,57 a man and a woman were engaged to be married.  Samulewicz, the 
woman, “was concerned about Simmons’s business and financial situation 
and the potential financial liability legal marriage could entail.”58  She ac-
cordingly broke off the engagement, but the couple continued to live together 
and, arguably, made a number of joint investments.59  After the relationship 
ended, Simmons sued to recover property from his ex-fiancée.  The court dis-
missed the contract and implied contract claims, emphasizing that “[c]ohab-
itation, no matter for how long, does not by itself prove the existence of a 
contract implied-in-fact.”60  The court nonetheless allowed an unjust enrich-
ment claim to move forward that provided Simmons an opportunity to re-
cover the $46,000 in mortgage payments and the tens of thousands of dollars 
                                                          
 54.  See, e.g., Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1155 (N.Y. 1980) (permitting enforcement 
of express contracts, but rejecting palimony claims as conceptually so amorphous as practically to 
defy equitable enforcement); see also Toth v. Spellman, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3417 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. July 7, 2011), aff’d, 945 N.Y.S.2d 557 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (rejecting application of construc-
tive trust to unmarried couple where one alleged that he had agreed to be “equal economic part-
ners”). 
 55.  See, e.g., Cates v. Swain, No. 2010-CT-01939-SCT, 2013 WL 1831783, at *5 (Miss. May 
2, 2013) (en banc); cf. Richards v. Brown, 222 P.3d 69, 80 (Utah Ct. App. 2009), aff’d on other 
grounds, 274 P.3d 911 (Utah 2012) (rejecting unjust enrichment claim where cohabitant’s contri-
butions to mortgage payments were equivalent to what he would have had to pay for a rental). 
 56.  See, e.g., Christian v. Christian, 365 N.E.2d 849, 855 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that agreements 
between spouses, unlike ordinary business contracts, involve a fiduciary relationship requiring the 
utmost of good faith); cf. Cates, 2013 WL 1831783, at *3 (expressly rejecting claims based on the 
nature of the relationship); Blumenthal v. Brewer, No. 118781, slip op. at 28 (Ill. filed Aug. 18, 
2016) (observing that “individuals can enter into an intimate relationship, but the relationship itself 
cannot form the basis to bring common-law claims”). 
 57.  304 P.3d 648 (Haw. Ct. App. 2013). 
 58.  Id. at 651.  
 59.  The parties had somewhat different descriptions of their financial arrangements. 
 60.  Id. at 656 (quoting Aehegma v. Aehegma, 797 P.2d 74, 79 (Haw. Ct. App. 1990)). 
CarboneCahnFinalBookProof 10/31/2016  3:22 PM 
68 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:55 
in other sums he had invested in properties held solely in Samulewicz’s 
name.61 
The early cases, like Marvin, and the scenarios that inspired the ALI 
Principles involved dependent partners who claim betrayal in the face of their 
partners’ decisions to end the relationship.  Scholars have protested that with-
out judicial intervention, the law “creates an incentive for the more finan-
cially savvy partner to opt out of marriage.”62  As women have gained greater 
economic independence, however, fewer partners are completely dependent 
on the relationship, and the law no longer recognizes either a moral impera-
tive to marry, or a requirement that either partner look out for the other.  And 
the decisions not to marry have become more complex, as both men and 
women increasingly seek greater equality as well as romance in marriage.63 
Samulewicz did not marry Simmons because she feared making a finan-
cial commitment to him.64  Marriage would have meant equitable distribution 
of property acquired during the marriage.  By not marrying, she owed him 
nothing for his services when her career took off and his did not during the 
period they lived together.  The court limited his potential claims to restitu-
tion, that is, return of the direct contributions he made to properties held in 
her name alone, but not to services he performed in managing her business 
investments.65  The court was willing to unwind their commingled financial 
affairs, but not willing to pass judgment on their conduct toward each other.66 
These court rulings reflect studies of the couples’ own attitudes toward 
nonmarriage.67  Unmarried couples are less likely than married couples to 
embrace financial interdependence.  They recognize the difference between 
marriage and nonmarriage, and the unmarried are less likely to have joint 
bank accounts, jointly titled property, or long-term commitments to care for 
                                                          
 61.  Id. at 658–59.  
 62.  Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 3, at 1424. 
 63.  See David M. Buss et al., A Half Century of Mate Preferences: The Cultural Evolution of 
Values, 63 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 491 (2001) (finding that both men and women have increased their 
emphasis on a potential spouse’s earning capacity); Christine R. Schwartz, Earnings Inequality and 
the Changing Association Between Spouses’ Earnings, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1524 (2010) (observing that 
both men and women seek to marry someone with comparable earning power). 
 64.  Simmons, 304 P.3d at 651 (“Samulewicz was concerned about Simmons’s business and 
financial situation and the potential financial liability legal marriage could entail.”). 
 65.  Id. at 658 (allowing unjust enrichment claim to go forward). 
 66.  Even then, there is no guarantee of recovery.  See, e.g., Richards v. Brown, 222 P.3d 69, 
80 (Utah Ct. App. 2009), aff’d on other grounds, 274 P.3d 911 (Utah 2012) (rejecting unjust en-
richment claim where cohabitant’s contributions to mortgage payments for his unmarried partner’s 
home were equivalent to what he would have had to pay for a rental). 
 67.  E.g., Daniel T. Lichter, Sharon Sassler, & Richard N. Turner, Cohabitation, Post-Concep-
tion Unions, and the Rise in Nonmarital Fertility, 47 SOC. SCI. RES. 134 (2014); Sharon Sassler & 
Amanda J. Miller, Class Differences in Cohabitation Processes, 60 FAM. REL. 163 (2011). 
CarboneCahnFinalBookProof 10/31/2016  3:22 PM 
2016] NONMARRIAGE 69 
each other.68  Indeed, a major reason for parties’ unwillingness to marry is 
often an unwillingness to make a financial commitment to a partner who is 
seen, as in the Simmons case, as more of a liability than an asset.69  The parties 
who bring high profile cases are outliers; they have more committed relation-
ships—and often more money—than typical cohabitants.70 
In addition, as same-sex couples have won greater recognition, couples 
who could not marry during most of their relationship, such as the Illinois 
doctor and lawyer in Blumenthal v. Brewer, have tried to use these doctrines 
to address the termination of marriage-like relationships.  Now that same-sex 
couples can marry, the frequency of this newer type of case is likely to di-
minish, and same-sex cohabitants will become comparable to different-sex 
cohabitants who make deliberate choices not to marry.71 
Courts often sympathize with the parties who feel betrayed.  And, as 
with the ALI Principles, there are some who, in the name of dismantling the 
distinctions between marriage and nonmarriage, would in fact apply marital 
principles to these parties.  But, neither the courts nor general public opinion 
have applied the normative commitments of marriage to other intimate part-
ners solely by virtue of cohabitation—at least when it comes to financial in-
terdependence.  Greater recognition has not meant equal results. 
B.  Nonmarriage and Shared Parenting 
The status of nonmarriage is more complex when it comes, first, to es-
tablishing parentage, and second, to obtaining child custody.  The process of 
acquiring legal parenthood differs for marital and nonmarital parents.  For 
married parents, a marital presumption assumes that both spouses are the par-
ents of any child born into the marriage; it accordingly functions as an “opt-
out” system.  In contrast, a nonmarital partner who does not give birth to the 
child must take affirmative steps to establish parenthood; which is an “opt-
in” system for the second parent.72  All states recognize the woman who gives 
                                                          
 68.  Fenaba R. Addo & Sharon Sassler, Financial Arrangements and Relationship Quality in 
Low-Income Couples, 59 FAM. REL. 408, 411 (2010) (finding that married couples are more likely 
to pool income). 
 69.  See infra notes 214–227 and accompanying text. 
 70.  See, e.g., Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation, supra note 3 (summarizing the studies and 
cases).  Women with less education are more likely to cohabit, and their relationships are less likely 
to transition to marriage.  See Casey E. Copen et al., First Premarital Cohabitation in the United 
States: 2006–2010 National Survey of Family Growth, NAT’L HEALTH STATISTICS REPORT 4–6, 
figs. 1–3 (2013), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr064.pdf.   
 71.  See Blumenthal v. Brewer, No. 118781, slip op. at 28 (Ill. filed Aug. 18, 2016) (“Since 
marriage is a legal relationship that all individuals may or may not enter into, Illinois does not act 
irrationally or discriminatorily in refusing to grant benefits and protections under the Marriage and 
Dissolution Act to those who do not participate in the institution of marriage.”). 
 72.  See Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
1185 (2016). 
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birth as a legal parent on the basis of her biological tie to the child.73  The 
states then permit the addition of a second adult as a legal parent on the basis 
of some combination of biology, function, or intent,74 though they vary in 
their requirements and the degree to which they give greater weight to biol-
ogy or function.75 
Custodial rights, in contrast, depend on a best interest of the child stand-
ard.  This standard applies regardless of whether the parties are married or 
unmarried parents.  But differences in application of the standard typically 
arise from the dissimilar circumstances of unmarried couples.76  As a practi-
cal matter, outside of surrogacy, almost all women who give birth leave the 
hospital with the child and, in more than a quarter of the states, the nonmarital 
birth mother enjoys a presumption in favor of her custody—any other custo-
dial arrangement typically requires court action.77  Consequently, a second 
parent who wants legal custody has to establish rights as a parent, and may 
be required to go to court to obtain a custody order.78  If the parties split, there 
is no automatic event, such as divorce, that will produce such an order, and 
unmarried parents, who tend to be poorer than married ones, are less likely 
to have the resources or the will to engage in litigation.79  Moreover, even if 
unmarried parents get to court, they may not have a sufficiently functional 
relationship with each other to make shared parenting of the child realistic.80 
                                                          
 73.  See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(a)(1) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 15 (Supp. 2008). 
This Article does not address the circumstances in which an unmarried partner with no biological 
relationship to the child should be recognized as a legal parent.  The states vary considerably in 
whether they allow such recognition at all, and if they do, whether they require adoption or merely 
the assumption of the functional role.  In addition, they differ considerably on whether the result is 
a legal parental status equal to that of the partner with the initial legal tie to the child or a secondary 
status, such as that of step-parent or parent by estoppel in accordance with the ALI Principles.  
While this Article does not address these issues, it proposes tying recognition of full and equal 
parental status to those circumstances in which there is both assumption of an equal role, and explicit 
consent to that role by the partner.  See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Parents, Babies, and More 
Parents, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (on file with authors).   
 74.  Some states, like California, allow recognition of partners with no biological connection to 
the child as parents based on the assumption of a parental role, while other states recognize such 
partners as parents only through adoption.  See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage, Parentage, 
and Child Support, 45 FAM. L. Q. 219, 220–21 (2011). 
 75.  See infra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing voluntary paternity establishment). 
 76.  See LESLIE JOAN HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW 865 (5th ed. 2013); Huntington, supra note 
16, at 203–05.  
 77.  See Huntington, supra note 16, at 204, 227. 
 78.  While many unmarried fathers establish paternity through voluntary acknowledgments of 
paternity at the time of the child’s birth, relatively few seek custodial orders after the breakup.  See 
BROWN & COOK, supra note 141, at 18–21 (establishing that relatively few unmarried fathers have 
custodial orders); Harris, infra note 102, at 1308–13 (observing that most unmarried fathers who 
are present with the mother at birth sign voluntary acknowledgments).  
 79.  See JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS 
REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2014). 
 80.  See infra Part III.B. 
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This Section begins by showing how legal developments provide in-
creasing recognition of unmarried legal parenthood and, for unmarried par-
ents who choose to litigate, a custody presumption identical to that available 
to married parents.  In addition, the courts do not shy away from normative 
judgments—many insist on the continued involvement of both parents fol-
lowing a break-up, and punish custodial parents who obstruct the other par-
ent’s access to the child.81  In this arena, the courts have been norm entrepre-
neurs, contributing to the development of principles to govern nonmarriage—
and these principles impose equality between the married and unmarried even 
where such equality does not reflect the parents’ own understanding of the 
terms of their relationships. 
1.  Parentage 
The legal recognition of nonmarital parenting, like the legal recognition 
of cohabitation, began in the 1970s.  Until then, a man who expected to play 
a parental role in a child’s life was expected to marry the mother; if he did 
not, he might not receive legal recognition as a parent at all.82  The United 
States Supreme Court changed that in 1972, deciding in Stanley v. Illinois83 
that the failure to provide unmarried fathers with any opportunity to play a 
parental role violated equal protection.84  The Court thus opened the door to 
greater rights for unmarried fathers, requiring the states to revisit the level of 
recognition they would provide.85  It stopped short, however, of prescribing 
what such recognition entailed.86 
Over the next seventeen years, the Supreme Court repeatedly struggled 
with the question of how far unmarried fathers’ constitutional rights ex-
tended.87  None of the Justices saw the issue solely as a question of biology 
or of formal equality between men and women, or married and unmarried 
                                                          
 81.  See infra notes 93–96. 
 82.  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 663–64 (1972) (describing an Illinois statute that refused 
to recognize a man as a legal father of his children at the mother’s death, even though he had lived 
with the mother and the children on and off for eighteen years).  
 83.  405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 84.  Id. at 663–64. 
 85.  See June Carbone, The Missing Piece of the Custody Puzzle: Creating a New Model of 
Parental Partnership, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1091, 1104–07 (1999) (reviewing the state re-
sponses in the context of fathers’ rights in adoption proceedings). 
 86.  Indeed, rather than finding an automatic right as the surviving parent, the Court held only 
that Peter Stanley had a right to a hearing as to whether he should receive custody of his children.  
Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649.  The state could not treat him as a stranger to the children he had helped 
to raise.  See also Josh Gupta-Kagan, In re Sanders and the Resurrection of Stanley v. Illinois, 5 
CAL. L. REV. 383 (2014). 
 87.  See Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. 
REV. 637, 647 (1993) (reviewing post-Stanley decisions). 
CarboneCahnFinalBookProof 10/31/2016  3:22 PM 
72 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:55 
men.88  Instead, the Justices focused on the normative question: what contri-
bution does a man have to make to a child to be entitled to constitutional 
protection as a father?89  Chief Justice Burger, in his dissenting opinion, an-
swered “marriage,”90 because he believed that fathers should acquire equal 
rights to mothers only if they made the commitment marriage entails.91  He 
referred to the often “casual” nature of the encounter that produced the child, 
and explained: “Centuries of human experience buttress this view of the re-
alities of human conditions and suggest that unwed mothers of illegitimate 
children are generally more dependable protectors of their children than are 
unwed fathers.”92  Justice White, who, of all the Justices of that era, gave the 
greatest weight to biology, nonetheless wrote for the Court that a father must 
“accept[] some measure of responsibility for the child’s future” before the 
Constitution could “compel a [s]tate to listen to his opinion of where the 
child’s best interests lie.”93  Over the course of subsequent cases, the state-
ment that commanded the greatest support, however, has been described as 
“biology plus.”94  Under this theory, in order for a nonmarital father to receive 
Due Process protection, he must demonstrate his “full commitment to the 
responsibilities of parenthood by ‘com[ing] forward to participate in the rear-
ing of his child’ . . . [and] [a]t that point it may be said that he ‘act[s] as a 
father toward his children.’”95 
While the Supreme Court has thus articulated a standard for unmarried 
fathers who wished to acquire constitutional protection, it has never resolved 
the issue of what obligations mothers owe unmarried men who wish to 
acknowledge their relationship with a child.96  For an unmarried father “to 
participate in the rearing of his child,”97 after all, the mother must cooper-
ate—and not all mothers welcome the participation of the father.98  In 1989, 
the Court, rather than address the issue head on, narrowly upheld the consti-
tutionality of the marital presumption against a challenge by the putative non-
marital father in Michael H. v. Gerald D.99  In Michael H., four Justices 
                                                          
 88.  Id. at 661. 
 89.  Id. at 662.  
 90. 405 U.S. 645, 659–68 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 91.  Id. at 665–66.  
 92.  Id. at 666.  
 93.  Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983). 
 94.  E.g., Deborah L. Forman, Unwed Fathers and Adoption: A Theoretical Analysis in Context, 
72 TEX. L. REV. 967, 975 (1994). 
 95.  Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 n.7, 392 (1979)).  
 96.  Carbone, supra note 85, at 1102 (concluding that “[w]hat the Court did not directly address 
was the father’s obligation to establish a parental relationship and the mother’s duty to let him”); 
see also infra Part IV.A. 
 97.  Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262. 
 98.  See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 16, at 194 (observing that a father’s continued involve-
ment with the child depends on his relationship with the mother).  
 99.  491 U.S. 110 (1989).  
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joined Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion, which recognized the mother’s hus-
band as the child’s legal father, even where the biological father had estab-
lished a relationship with the child and lived with the mother and child for 
several months after the child’s birth.100  Since this notably fractured vote, 
the Court has not addressed the issue.101 
At the time of Michael H., relatively few unmarried fathers opted into 
formal parental status; only thirty-one percent of children with unmarried 
parents had a father whose paternity had been established.102  In the years 
after Michael H., Congress and the states made it easier for unmarried fathers 
to receive recognition as parents, but these legislative efforts focused heavily 
on securing child support; custodial rights were an afterthought.103  Over the 
course of the 1980s and 1990s, Congress repeatedly created incentives for 
the states to streamline paternity establishment and improve child support 
collection efforts.104  Between 1992 and 2010, the number of paternity estab-
lishments tripled.105   
These efforts addressed another issue left open by the Supreme Court: 
what obligation did unmarried men owe their children?106  Congress became 
interested in paternity establishment and child support enforcement as a re-
sult of its concern over the increase in the federal welfare rolls,107 which, it 
concluded, was “to a considerable extent, a problem of the non-support of 
children by their absent parents.”108  This congressional approach viewed 
women as incapable of supporting a child on their own and assumed that the 
only reason that mothers were single and in need was because fathers had 
deserted them.109  In implementing the Family Support Act of 1988, which 
required every state to devise mandatory child support guidelines,110 states 
                                                          
 100.  The Justices disagreed in part over Justice Scalia’s invocation of originalism to find no 
historical support for recognition of rights for an “adulterous natural father,” with Justices Kennedy 
and O’Connor refusing to join in that part of the opinion.  Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127–28 n.6. 
 101.  The Court did rule against an unmarried father seeking to prevent adoption of his child in 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013), but did so on statutory grounds without 
reaching the father’s constitutional rights. 
 102.  Leslie Joan Harris, Reforming Paternity Law to Eliminate Gender, Status, and Class Ine-
quality, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1295, 1300, 1304 n.51 (2013). 
 103.  See Huntington, supra note 16, at 183–84 (discussing a state-initiated child support system 
independent of custodial rights). 
 104.  See Harris, supra note 102 at 1304 & n.52.  
 105.  Id. at 1304 n.53. 
 106.  Carbone, supra note 85, at 1102. 
 107.  Ann Laquer Estin, Federalism and Child Support, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 541, 549 
(1998). 
 108.  Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 93-1490 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 8133, 8145). 
 109.  See David L. Chambers, Fathers, the Welfare System, and the Virtues and Perils of Child-
Support Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2575, 2588 (1995) (noting that “it is men who walk away 
from their children, and women left in poverty who bear the burden”). 
 110.  Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988) (amending 42 
U.S.C. §§ 666, 667 (2012) (making use of child support guidelines mandatory)).  
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drew no distinctions between divorced fathers and unmarried men who had 
never been in a relationship with the mothers of their children.111  All fathers 
owed support, and marriage or nonmarriage did not change that obligation.  
While divorced women were more likely to seek and obtain child support 
orders than women who had never been married,112 the child support system 
assumed that all men had duties to support their children.113 
The expansion of the child support system established a foundation for 
a later revision of custody rights.  In the years after Stanley, the law changed 
to make it easier for unmarried fathers to “opt in” to parental recognition.  
Indeed, federal law has encouraged the states to streamline paternity deter-
minations through voluntary acknowledgments of paternity that can be 
signed in the hospital when the child is born, and most unmarried parents sign 
such acknowledgements.114  Once parentage is established, all legal parents 
not only are subject to the same support obligations, they also acquire equal 
standing to seek custody in accordance with the best interests of the child.115 
2.  Child Custody 
Custody determinations for nonmarital parents parallel those for marital 
parents upon divorce.  From the early nineteenth through the late twentieth 
century, custody laws adopted a “tender years presumption” that favored 
granting custody of young children to their mothers.116  And, during the initial 
                                                          
 111.  Id. (referring to “persons”); see also, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 12-204 (2016) 
(referring to “parent”). 
 112.  Chambers, supra note 109, at 2588–89 (observing that while two-thirds of divorced moth-
ers had child support orders, only one-third of children born to unmarried mothers had a legal father 
who could be held liable for support). 
 113.  Id. at 2589 (noting the widely shared belief that absent parents should support their chil-
dren). 
 114.  42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(i)(I) (2012) (father’s name will be placed on the birth certificate 
if “the father and mother have signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity”); see Harris, supra 
note 102, at 1308–13. 
 115.  See Stacy Brustin & Lisa Vollendorf Martin, Paved with Good Intentions: Unintended 
Consequences of Federal Proposals to Integrate Child Support and Parenting Time, 48 IND. L. 
REV. 803, 810 (2015) (observing that in the majority of states, legally recognized parents have co-
extensive parental rights and responsibilities by operation of law, regardless of their marital status 
and how they choose to structure their households). 
 116.  See MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 61–62 
(1994); Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: The Fathers’ Rights Movement and Family Ine-
qualities, 102 VA. L. REV. 79, 114–15 (2016) (discussing challenges to the “tender years” presump-
tion). 
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period streamlining paternity establishment, custody laws favored moth-
ers.117  Since then, however, the law has shifted to a model of shared parent-
ing that places far more weight on the continued involvement of both parents 
in the child’s life.118 
Most custody statutes give equal rights to men and women and do not 
distinguish explicitly between married and unmarried parents.119  Instead, in 
every state, the courts apply a best interest of the child standard, which favors 
case-specific determinations.120  While these determinations typically give 
some weight to the parent who has been the child’s primary caretaker, most 
states presume that the child’s interests lie in continuing contact with both 
parents.121  In addition, many states favor a custody award to the parent most 
likely to facilitate the continued involvement of the other parent.122  These 
“friendly parent” provisions give courts the ability to threaten parents who 
obstruct the other parent’s involvement with loss of custody,123 and the num-
ber of reported opinions transferring custody from mothers to fathers on this 
basis has increased.124  These statutes reflect the changing custody standards 
                                                          
 117.  See, e.g., William Weston, Putative Fathers’ Rights to Custody—A Rocky Road at Best, 10 
WHITTIER L. REV. 683, 685 (1989) (“Irrespective of the living arrangement at the time custody is 
determined, the putative father faces a more difficult task in proving that the best interests of the 
child are served by a placement with him.”). 
 118.  See J. Herbie DiFonzo, From the Rule of One to Shared Parenting: Custody Presumptions 
in Law and Policy, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 213, 216 (2014) (observing that “[t]he most significant trend 
in contemporary child custody law is toward greater active involvement by both parents in continued 
child rearing after separation” (quoting Pruett & DiFonzo, infra note 211, at 152)). 
 119.  One state, Massachusetts, explicitly applies different custody standards to married and un-
married parents.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C, § 10 (2016) (nonmarital); ch. 208 § 31 (marital); see 
also, e.g., Smith v. McDonald, 941 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Mass. 2010) (holding that a nonmarital father had 
no legal rights prior to paternity establishment, but that once established, visitation was appropriate).  
Indeed, Martha Fineman has proposed that the parenting framework shift to recognize that the 
mother/child dyad is the primary caretaking unit.  See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE 
NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 9 
(1995).   
 120.  Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Emery, Gender Politics and Child Custody: The Puzzling 
Persistence of the Best-Interests Standard, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 83–88 (2014) (discussing 
the difficulty of validating domestic violence allegations). 
 121.  See N.H. REV. STAT. § 461-A:6(f)–(g) (2015); Schwieterman v. Schwieterman, 114 So. 3d 
984, 986–87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (“It is the public policy of this state that each minor child 
has frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents separate . . . to share the 
rights and responsibilities, and joys, of childrearing.” (quoting 2009 Fla. Laws Ch. 2009-180 § 3, at 
1853)); DiFonzo, supra note 118, at 217, 225; Charts, 48 FAM. L.Q. 654, 656 (2015) (depicting 
custody criteria in Chart 2).  Continuing contact can take the form of joint physical and/or legal 
custody, parenting plans, or other orders that allocate shares of the child’s time and parental deci-
sionmaking authority.  See, e.g., HARRIS ET AL., supra note 76, at 570–89. 
 122.  See DiFonzo, supra note 118, at 217, 225.  
 123.  See, e.g., ARK. CODE. § 9-13-101(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2015) (providing that when a “parent 
demonstrates a pattern of willfully creating conflict in an attempt to disrupt a current or pending 
joint-custody arrangement,” the court can modify a shared custody award “to an order of primary 
custody to the nondisruptive parent”). 
 124.  See, e.g., In re Mannion, 917 A.2d 1272, 1275–76 (N.H. 2007). 
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applied to married couples.125  When applied to the unmarried, however, they 
produce results at odds with the principles in the financial cases and often 
with the parties’ own understandings of their relationships. 
Consider the case of In re Myers and Smith.126  A four-year-old, who 
was the subject of a custody fight between his parents, was born in 2011 after 
what the court describes as “a brief relationship” between two “young and 
immature” people.  Amber, the mother, had custody after the child’s birth in 
Iowa, while Nick, the child’s father, joined the Navy and was stationed in 
Virginia.  He married another woman, Jennifer, in 2012.  When the child was 
three-and-a-half years old, the court transferred custody from the mother to 
the father, solely because of the mother’s lack of cooperation with the father.  
She did not provide him with her new address when she moved, cooperate 
with his efforts to provide military benefits for the child, facilitate visitation, 
or support the father’s relationship with the child.  The trial court also found 
that the child, understandably, had a closer relationship with the mother and 
that the father also had anger management issues, and difficulty controlling 
his disdain for the mother.  The trial court called the issue a “close call,”127 
but transferred custody to the father after finding the father to be more ma-
ture, based on the success of his military career, the stability of his marriage, 
and his record of paying child support.  The court of appeals affirmed, em-
phasizing the mother’s failure to support the father’s involvement with the 
child.128 
An increasing number of cases reach similar results.129  The New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court observed in 2011: “Across the country, the great weight 
of authority holds that conduct by one parent that tends to alienate the child’s 
affections from the other is so inimical to the child’s welfare as to be grounds 
for a denial of custody . . . .”130  In articulating these standards, the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court cited a case involving married parents131 and then 
uncritically applied the same standard to an on again, off again relationship 
between unmarried parents.132  The court, in effect, held that interference with 
                                                          
 125.  See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 126.  In re Myers and Smith, No. 15-0842, 2016 BL 11287 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2016). 
 127.  Id. at *2. 
 128.  Id. at *3. 
 129.  See James N. Bow, Jonathon W. Gould & James R. Flens, Examining Parental Alienation 
in Child Custody Cases: A Survey of Mental Health and Legal Professionals, 37 AM. J. FAM. 
THERAPY 127, 136 (2009) (estimating that thirty percent of cases involve parental-alienation 
claims). 
 130.  In re Matter of Miller, 20 A.3d 854 (N.H. 2011) (quoting Renaud. v. Renaud, 721 A.2d 
463, 465–66 (Vt. 1998)). 
 131.  Id. (citing Renaud v. Renaud, 721 A.2d 463, 465–66 (Vt. 1998) (case involving married 
parents where the mother, who alleged that the father abused the child, was threatened with loss of 
custody if she did not cooperate in restoring the father’s relationship with the child)). 
 132.  Id. 
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a second parent’s visitation—regardless of marital status—is so serious as 
“to raise a strong possibility that the child will be harmed.”133 
Courts applying these precepts tend to assume such harm, even where 
the child has a strong relationship with one parent and little relationship with 
the other.  At divorce, parents have typically lived together and with the child 
for some period of time; in nonmarital custody cases the patterns are more 
varied.  In K.T.D. v. K.W.P.,134 for example, the mother was sixteen and the 
father twenty-one at the time of the child’s birth.  The father established pa-
ternity and received visitation when the child was nine months old.  By the 
time the child was four, the parents, who did not communicate well and 
agreed on little, both moved to change the visitation arrangements, with the 
father seeking sole physical and legal custody and the mother seeking to re-
strict the father’s visitation rights.  The court transferred custody from mother 
to father because of the mother’s “poor judgment” in failing to support the 
father’s relationship with the child.135  In an additional case, an Arkansas 
court transferred custody of a three-year-old with cancer from the mother to 
the father, with whom the child had never had an overnight visit, because of 
the mother’s inability to maintain a civil relationship with the father.136  The 
trial court judge called the mother “evil” from the bench because of her fail-
ure to tell the father of the child’s ear tube surgery, after the mother called 
the father’s house twice to inform him, but both times the father’s mother 
hung up on her, presumably because of the lack of civility in their relation-
ship.137  The court of appeals affirmed the transfer of custody, even though 
the mother established a similar pattern of noncooperation on the father’s part 
after the transfer occurred.138 
At one time, courts opposed sharing (also termed “joint”) custody be-
cause they presumed that parents who could not manage to stay together for 
the children’s benefit could also not manage to cooperate well enough to par-
ent constructively after they parted.139  Today, in contrast, the law in many 
states imposes a duty of cooperation, whether or not the parties are capable 
of implementing it.140  While unmarried fathers remain less likely to seek 
                                                          
 133.  Id. at 862 (quoting Webb v. Knudsen, 582 A.2d 282, 286 (N.H. 1990)). 
 134.  119 So. 3d 418 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012). 
 135.  Id. at 421.  
 136.  Sharp v. Keeler, 256 S.W.3d 528 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007). 
 137.  Id. at 541–42.  
 138.  Id. 
 139.  See DiFonzo, supra note 118, at 215 (observing that the dominant view was that a child 
needed the stability of a single home run by only one parent, and that shifting the child from parent 
to parent would result in “a permanent injury to the child”). 
 140.  Shared parenting has become more common both globally and in the United States, but 
jurisdictions continue to vary widely in the strength of their support for such an award.  See Santo 
v. Santo, No. 0061, 2015 WL 5921468, at *5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Oct. 9, 2015), aff’d, 448 Md. 620, 
141 A.3d 74 (2016) (upholding shared custody award where parents lacked ability to cooperate 
despite strong Maryland precedent counseling against shared custody awards in such cases); Linda 
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custodial orders,141 they have become more likely to prevail when they do.142  
The result imposes a one-size-fits-all model of parenting relationships: all 
parents are deemed subject to duties of formal financial support and all par-
ents are expected to share parenting responsibilities.  In both cases, courts 
impose these standards and police them in punitive ways.  Parents who fail 
to pay support, even if they are incarcerated or unemployed, are subject to 
mounting arrears that may subject them to contempt proceedings, loss of 
driver’s licenses, or imprisonment.143  Custodial parents who fail to facilitate 
contact with the other parent also face punitive measures that include loss of 
the custody of the child. 
*  * * 
As a comment on the status of nonmarriage, these cases present con-
trasting models of judicial intervention.  In both financial claims and child 
custody cases, the law began with a presumption that all women were finan-
cially dependent and unable to raise children on their own without a man’s 
support; marriage, therefore, supplied an important and necessary structure 
that justified the refusal to recognize nonmarriage at all.  Today, courts 
acknowledge striking changes in the relationship between marriage and non-
marriage, have legitimized nonmarital relationships, and presume that men 
and women are equally capable of supporting themselves and raising children 
on their own.  In the financial context, this conclusion leads to hands-off doc-
trines.144  The courts will intervene in accordance with the parties’ express 
agreements or, if none exist, in accordance with restitution standards that un-
tangle the parties’ respective contributions to asset acquisition.145  The result 
respects the parties’ autonomy.  In the child support and custody contexts, by 
contrast, the law imposes obligations irrespective of the parties’ agreements 
and circumstances.146  In the name of equality, the law treats unmarried par-
ents identically to married ones.147  It refuses to acknowledge agreements that 
                                                          
Nielsen, Shared Physical Custody: Does It Benefit Most Children?, 28 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 
79, 81 (2015). 
 141.  See PATRICIA BROWN & STEVEN T. COOK, CHILDREN’S PLACEMENT ARRANGEMENTS IN 
DIVORCE AND PATERNITY CASES IN WISCONSIN 2, 9–12, 18–19 (2012), 
http://www.irp.wisc.edu/research/childsup/cspolicy/pdfs/2009-11/Task4A_CS_09-
11_Final_revi2012.pdf. 
 142.  See DiFonzo, supra note 118, at 215.   
 143.  Moreover, courts often impose such punitive consequences even when the parties’ behav-
ior corresponds with community norms or their own agreements.  See, e.g., Solangel Maldonado, 
Deadbeat or Deadbroke: Redefining Child Support for Poor Fathers, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991, 
995–96 (2006) (observing that fathers in poor communities often provide informal support and play 
active roles in their children’s lives that may not necessarily conform to mainstream emphasis on 
fathers as providers). 
 144.  See supra Part I.B.1. 
 145.  See supra Part I.B.1.  
 146.  See supra Part I.B.2. 
 147.  A minority of states, however, does distinguish on the basis of marital status.  See Bernardo 
Cuadra, Note, Family Law—Maternal and Joint Custody Presumptions for Unmarried Parents: 
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terminate support obligations, community norms that allocate greater respon-
sibility to one parent over another, or the variety of circumstances that make 
nonmarital parents worse candidates for cooperative parenting than married 
ones.148 
Moreover, while the courts often justify these determinations in terms 
of the best interests of the child, they are not necessarily individualized 
ones.149  Instead, the courts apply a body of law that developed to meet the 
particular circumstances of married couples to unmarried couples.  The con-
trasts between this body of law and the body of law concerning financial 
claims are striking.  In the context of financial obligations, courts and schol-
ars have recognized that the failure to intervene favors the financially better 
off party.  Indeed, the ALI proposed extending the obligation of the married 
to the unmarried precisely in order to address such concerns.  Yet, courts 
remain wary of such interventions.  As women’s economic opportunities in-
creased, the courts have recognized the increasing variety of circumstances 
that underlie cohabitation and have refused to intervene, even if that refusal 
strengthens the position of the financially dominant partner. 
The opposite is true in cases involving children.  Scholars have docu-
mented the ways that the realities of nonmarital parenting are at odds with 
the courts’ assumptions150 and, in fact, exist on a continuum ranging from 
very involved to mostly absent fathers.  In addition, studies show that those 
who do not marry tend to have different characteristics from those who do in 
ways that affect the likelihood of violence, the ability to cooperate, and the 
level of communication—all factors that affect children.151  Yet, courts, ra-
ther than making the individualized determinations the law would seem to 
require, seem more inclined to impose a normative conclusion on the unmar-
ried: all parenting requires acceptance of a shared custody and support 
model.152  This result both reduces the autonomy of nonmarital couples and 
changes the balance of power between nonmarried partners rather than re-
specting the emerging role of nonmarriage as an alternative system. 
                                                          
Constitutional and Policy Considerations in Massachusetts and Beyond, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 
599, 618–22 (2010) (summarizing state laws). 
 148.  See supra Part I.B.2.  
 149.  This is particularly true in the cases of poor families facing overcrowded courts.  See Daniel 
L. Hatcher, Forgotten Fathers, 93 B.U. L. REV. 897, 910 (2013) (“Courts that address child-support 
issues impacting poor fathers can often barely be characterized as courts. . . .  Jaded fact finders are 
often not real judges.  The rooms are overflowing and chaotic.  Lawyers are usually not present . . . .  
Some fathers are in chains, brought in from prison. . . .  In such circumstances, essentialism 
reigns.”).  
 150.  See id.; Cahn, supra note 15. 
 151.  See KATHRYN EDIN & TIMOTHY J. NELSON, DOING THE BEST I CAN: FATHERHOOD IN 
THE INNER CITY (2013); W. BRADFORD WILCOX & NICHOLAS H. WOLFINGER, SOUL MATES: 
RELIGION, SEX, LOVE, AND MARRIAGE AMONG AFRICAN AMERICANS AND LATINOS (2016); June 
Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The Triple System of Family Law, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1185 (2013). 
 152.  See DiFonzo, supra note 118, at 215. 
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II.  MARRIAGE ESSENTIALS 
Creating a distinct legal status for nonmarriage requires understanding 
the legal status of marriage.  The laws that apply to marriage adopt a single 
coherent view of what the institution should be.  Today, these laws reinforce 
marriage as a relationship between equals premised on unqualified commit-
ment, interdependence, and shared parenting. 
Spouses no longer vow to love, honor, and obey.  Instead, they agree to 
trust, honor, and cooperate.  This change in the nature of marriage accord-
ingly frames both judicial divisions at divorce and couples’ decisions to 
marry or to not marry.  In addition, while the law permits individual marital 
contracting, it does not hesitate to address the normative core of marriage as 
an institution.153  This normative vision enshrines the equal status of the 
spouses.  In this Part, we explore the premises of equality that characterize 
marital status itself, then turn to the law’s reinforcement of financial interde-
pendence, and finally, look at the marital norm of shared parenting. 
A.  Equality and the Importance of Marital Choice 
In the era in which heterosexual intimacy inevitably involved the possi-
bility of pregnancy, marriage was designed to channel sexuality and chil-
drearing into an explicitly gendered two-parent union.  With this system, the 
shotgun marriage served to shoehorn two people who might not know each 
other terribly well into an indissoluble institution.154  Three revolutions in 
family law have transformed marriage: (1) marriage no longer serves as the 
exclusive or permanent location for sexuality, procreation, and childrearing; 
(2) spouses have equal roles; and (3) couples, regardless of their gender, have 
access to partners of their choice.  In turn, these revolutions make marriage a 
deliberate choice built on a foundation of equality and interdependence. 
A core revolution in family law has eliminated the compulsion that once 
made marriage the sole legitimate institution for sex and raising children.  
Marriage (and, it once went without saying, heterosexual marriage155) de-
fined women’s lives and constituted a critical part of full adult status for 
                                                          
 153.  But see Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals: From One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodern Mar-
riage Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1479 (2001). 
 154.  George A. Akerlof, Janet L. Yellen & Michael L. Katz, An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock 
Childbearing in the United States, 111 Q.J. ECON. 277 (1996).  
 155.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2614 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (refer-
ring to the traditional definition of marriage as “biologically rooted”). 
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men.156  Unmarried women—and men—faced suspicion, if not outright hos-
tility and discrimination.157  The restrictions of alternatives outside of mar-
riage served to channel men and women into marriage and to keep them 
there.158 
The law has dismantled these restrictions, providing greater recognition 
of nonmarital unions and easing the barriers to divorce.  Along with the 
greater acknowledgment of nonmarital unions we described in the first sec-
tion, the law extended access to contraception to the unmarried and abortion 
to all women, emphasizing that pregnancy should not be the punishment for 
sexual activity.159  And in Lawrence v. Texas,160 the Supreme Court struck 
down the criminalization of same-sex sodomy, effectively extending consti-
tutional protection to private sexual activity.161 
In adopting divorce reform, which swept state legislatures between the 
mid-sixties and mid-eighties, the law did not just make it easier for couples 
to divorce—it also eliminated fault grounds that required the courts to judge 
spousal conduct linked to adultery, desertion, and cruelty, which had once 
served as the exclusive basis for divorce.162  After the reforms, approximately 
half of the states banned the consideration of traditional fault grounds as part 
of the financial award,163 while the rest of the states allowed it to be consid-
                                                          
 156.  Andrew J. Cherlin, The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage, 66 J. MARRIAGE & 
FAM. 848 (2004). 
 157.  And, some argue that the unmarried continue to face such suspicion today.  See Courtney 
G. Joslin, Marital Status Discrimination 2.0, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 805, 806 (2015). 
 158.  See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1991) (commenting on 
the relationship between the lack of a power to exit a marriage and the inequality within the mar-
riage). 
 159.  See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contraception); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973) (abortion). 
 160.  539 U.S. 558 (2003); see id. at 567 (“When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate 
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more 
enduring.”).  
 161.  Id. at 578–79.  
 162.  E.g., HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW 
IN THE UNITED STATES 64–65 (1988); see also Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in A Modern 
Divorce Law, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 776 (1996) (describing shift from the fault era, when all states 
allowed consideration of fault, to the no fault divorce era, in which approximately half the states 
ban consideration of fault altogether while the rest allow some limited consideration). 
 163.  Ellman, supra note 162.  Ellman observes further that about two-third of the states do not 
allow consideration of fault in the financial award, but a larger number permit consideration of fault 
in the spousal support award.  Id. at 782.   
CarboneCahnFinalBookProof 10/31/2016  3:22 PM 
82 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:55 
ered to varying degrees, but rarely as the exclusive consideration in the fi-
nancial award164 and to a lesser degree in property distributions than support 
awards.165 
With the courts no longer overseeing the regulation of sexual conduct 
to the same degree, a second revolution made equality and sharing principles 
the new foundation for the relationship between spouses, both within mar-
riage and at divorce.  Until the mid-twentieth century, state and federal law 
imposed clearly-delineated gender roles within marriage.  The husband alone 
had a duty of support and, during the marriage, he unilaterally controlled not 
only his own income, upon which the family typically depended, but also the 
couples’ jointly-held property.166  These legally enforced roles made wives 
dependent on their husbands and, correspondingly, made it practically as well 
as legally difficult to leave a marriage.167  Over the last half-century, Supreme 
Court and state law reforms have remade marriage in accordance with prin-
ciples of equality, giving both spouses joint decisionmaking authority over 
assets and children and dividing both more equally at divorce.168  The result 
                                                          
 164.  See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at § 2 (updated 2016) (listing how states consider fault 
in Topic 2, “Whether Marital Misconduct Should be Considered in Property Allocations and 
Awards of Compensatory Payments”).  Louisiana law, for example, states, “[w]hen a spouse has 
not been at fault prior to the filing of a petition for divorce and is in need of support, based on the 
needs of that party and the ability of the other party to pay, that spouse may be awarded final periodic 
support.”  LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 112A (2016).  
 165.  See Strauss, supra note 4, at 1273 (“The states are split about whether marital misbehavior 
is relevant to property division or alimony.”).  Ellman explains that almost all states allow consid-
eration of misconduct that dissipates assets or results in a party’s greater need because of medical 
bills or other factors.  Ellman, supra note 162, at 776–77.  He observes further that determining the 
continuing role of fault is difficult because trial court practice often differs considerably from the 
formal law, with some judges restricting the role of fault in financial awards where the law would 
seem to allow it and other judges taking it into account, even where the statute does not direct them 
to do so.  Id. at 777. 
 166.  Indeed, a major reason that fault no longer influences property division to the same degree 
is that most states today view marital property as the product of both spouses’ efforts over the course 
of the marriage and therefore as jointly owned.  Ellman, supra note 162, at 783 (observing that the 
fifteen states that allow consideration of fault in the allocation of property at divorce overlap to a 
considerable degree with “those common law states that have been most resistant generally to mov-
ing from the common law marital property system to the marital property idea of joint ownership”).   
 167.  A finding of adultery, for example, could stigmatize a woman and justify denying her the 
support she needed to survive after a divorce along with any contact with her children.  See Barbara 
Bennett Woodhouse & Katharine T. Bartlett, Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in 
a No-Fault Era, 82 GEO L.J. 2525, 2532–33 (1994) (briefly describing “old fashioned ‘fault-driven’ 
systems”). 
 168.  E.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (striking down an Alabama alimony statute that al-
lowed for such awards only to women); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 74 (1971) (marking the first 
time that the Court applied the Equal Protection Clause to gender discrimination, finding unconsti-
tutional an Idaho statute that favored men over women in estate administration).  Dismantling the 
gendered assignment of marital roles has simultaneously made the relationship between spouses 
more equal, increased couples’ freedom to enter into binding premarital agreements with respect to 
their financial affairs, and enhanced women’s decisionmaking power (and thus autonomy) within 
marriage.  These changes, however, do not represent complete freedom to determine the content of 
marriage, particularly with respect to children.  See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
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has changed marriage from a structure that fostered dependency based on 
rigidly-defined gender roles to an interdependent union that requires greater 
cooperation and coordination between the couple.169 
These changes in the nature of marriage lay the foundation for the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges.  In Obergefell, the Court 
recognized that, in light of this new vision of marriage as a union of equals, 
the restriction of the institution to different-sex couples had become an 
anachronism.170  The Court emphasized that the twin commands of equality 
grounded in the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution and autonomy 
based on the Due Process Clause were “connected in a profound way,” both 
individually and together compelling recognition of marriage equality.171  
The majority opinion identified these principles with dismantling the systems 
of inequality that made marriage an intrinsically gendered union, and coer-
cion that made marriage the sole acceptable locus for sexuality and childrear-
ing.172 
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent, in contrast, opposed marriage equality 
because of what he saw as the continuing link between sexual relations, chil-
drearing, and the marital bond.173  In rejecting this view of marriage, the ma-
jority embraced an institution premised more on the ability to choose an equal 
partner than on the continued need for marriage as an exclusive—and univer-
sal—institution premised on the relationship to childrearing.174 
                                                          
 169.  See, e.g., June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Whither/Wither Alimony?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 925 
(2015) (reviewing CYNTHIA LEE STARNES, THE MARRIAGE BUYOUT: THE TROUBLED 
TRAJECTORY OF U.S. ALIMONY LAW (2014)) (discussing the changing expectations of marriage); 
Douglas NeJaime, Windsor’s Right to Marry, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 219, 244 (2013) (stating that 
marriage is now associated with “adult romantic affiliation, emotional and economic interdepend-
ence”). 
 170.  135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015).  But see Allison Anna Tait, The Return of Coverture, 114 
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 99, 100 (2016) (arguing that the decision reflects a “regressive” 
vision of marriage).  It also sought to reinforce the centrality of marriage as an institution.  See, e.g., 
Serena Mayeri, Marriage (In)equality and the Historical Legacies of Feminism, 6 CAL. L. REV. 
CIR. 126, 127 (2015). 
 171.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602–03.  
 172.  Id. at 2602 (“The right to marry is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition, but 
rights come not from ancient sources alone.  They rise, too, from a better informed understanding 
of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era.”). 
 173.  Id. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Therefore, for the good of children and society, 
sexual relations that can lead to procreation should occur only between a man and a woman com-
mitted to a lasting bond.”).  Justice Alito’s dissent similarly objected that the majority’s understand-
ing of marriage “focuses almost entirely on the happiness of persons who choose to marry.”  Id. at 
2641 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 174.  In doing so, the Court did not ignore the relationship between marriage and children.  In-
deed, it saw marriage as important to the ability of same-sex couples to command community sup-
port for the families they had created.  The Court nonetheless linked the stability and permanence 
that it associated with marriage to the spouses’ ability to choose a suitable partner rather than to any 
association with biology or tradition, much less gender hierarchy and coercion.  Id. at 2600 (majority 
opinion). 
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The movements towards marriage as a system of formal equality be-
tween two spouses, who to a much greater degree today can choose to enter 
and leave marriage on terms of their choosing, have fundamentally shifted 
the legal regulation of marriage.  Marriage has come to mean the agreement 
of the spouses to assume joint and equal responsibility for their financial af-
fairs and any resulting children—a meaning reinforced by property, parent-
age, and custody laws. 
B.  Financial Partnership Within Marriage 
Consistent with these changes, state family laws moved towards recog-
nition of a new model of marriage with spouses having interdependent and 
equal roles during marriage and upon divorce.175  In accordance with this 
model, a husband was no longer solely liable for expenses incurred by his 
wife (and could no longer rape his wife with impunity).176  All states today 
accord both spouses equal management rights over jointly titled property.  
When one spouse dies, the other is entitled to a significant share of property 
in the decedent’s estate, even when the will sets out contrary intent, in recog-
nition of a partnership theory of marriage.177 
                                                          
 175.  This change is often called the “partnership theory of marriage,” and it is associated with 
a change in property division in common law states from a title system to one of equitable distribu-
tion, premised on the joint contributions of the spouses.  Mississippi was the last state in the country 
to make this shift.  See Deborah H. Bell, Equitable Distribution: Implementing the Marital Partner-
ship Theory Through the Dual Classification System, 67 MISS. L.J. 115, 124–25 (1997).  Bell iden-
tifies marital partnership theory with three assumptions: first, that “when two persons marry they 
make a commitment to the marital unit” to contribute to the family welfare and to share the results 
of their joint efforts; second, that homemaking contributions enable the wage-earner to produce; 
and, third, that “because homemaking enables earning, its value is proportional to the income pro-
duced.  Accordingly, the assets produced by the efforts of either spouse belong to the partnership, 
and each spouse has a right to a fair share of the partnership’s assets.”  Id. at 125 (quoting and then 
citing Jean M. Krauskopf, Classifying Marital and Separate Property – Combinations and Increase 
in Value of Separate Property, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 997, 997–98 (1987)). 
 176.  See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 844–48 
(2004) (noting changes towards sex-neutral laws, even if the ultimate effect does not eliminate ves-
tiges of coverture). 
 177.  See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2 general cmt. (amended 2010).  The partnership theory of 
marriage is based on mutual commitment and respect, with commitment based on emotional ties 
rather than social obligation.  See, e.g., PAUL AMATO ET AL., ALONE TOGETHER: HOW MARRIAGE 
IN AMERICA IS CHANGING 14 (2007) (discussing the development of “companionate marriage”); 
STARNES, supra note 169, at 155–60 (discussing application of partnership principles to marriage); 
Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2046 (2010) (discussing partnership theory of marriage); Ellman, supra 
note 162, at 820 (noting that equitable distribution of marital property is tied to a “premise of eco-
nomic partnership and entitlement to fair share of accumulated property”); Alan Newman, Incorpo-
rating the Partnership Theory of Marriage into Elective-Share Law: The Approximation System of 
the Uniform Probate Code and the Deferred-Community-Property Alternative, 49 EMORY L.J. 487 
(2000); Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal Rights Under the Re-
vised Uniform Probate Code, 76 IOWA L. REV. 223, 236–42 (1991) (discussing 1990 UPC reforms 
of elective share based on the concept of marriage as partnership). 
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For divorce, all states adopted some form of an equitable distribution 
system that gives both spouses a claim to all property acquired through the 
efforts of either spouse during the marriage.178  In 1994, Mississippi became 
the last state to abandon a common law title system in which property own-
ership typically depended on which party’s name was listed on the deed.179  
Some states explicitly presume that marital property should be equally di-
vided, while other states reach a similar outcome based on principles of eq-
uitable distribution.180  Even if, for example, the spouses live in different 
states and establish their own separate and successful businesses, courts may 
still order a fifty/fifty split upon divorce.181 
At the same time, states have backed away from long-term alimony.182  
The law now treats marriage as a partnership premised on equal contribu-
tions, to be split when the relationship ends.183  It also treats spouses, what-
ever their division of labor during the marriage, as capable of independence 
upon divorce.  Long-term support, which never was all that common, has 
become increasingly rare.184  It typically occurs only at the end of a long-term 
marriage, where one party was a full-time homemaker and there is a signifi-
cant difference in income.185  These changes make marriage an institution 
that reflects each spouse’s choice to become a member of a shared commu-
nity that “facilitates interdependent sharing, . . . intimacy and commit-
ment.”186 
                                                          
 178.  See Bell, supra note 175, at 122. 
 179.  Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 927 (Miss. 1994) (en banc). 
 180.  See Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1853, 1872 (2012); 
Marsha Garrison, What’s Fair in Divorce Property Distribution: Cross-National Perspectives from 
Survey Evidence, 72 LA. L. REV. 57, 70 (2011). 
 181.  Arneault v. Arneault, 639 S.E.2d 720, 728 (W.Va. 2006); see Hamm v. Hamm, 350 P.3d 
124, 127 (Okla. 2015) (discussing wife’s receipt of almost $1 billion property settlement on di-
vorce); David N. Hofstein et al., Equitable Distribution Involving Large Marital Estates, 26 J. AM. 
ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 311, 313 (2014) (concluding that even in states in which there is not a 
presumption of equal division, cases increasingly award equal division even where significant assets 
were created by one spouse).   
 182.  Carbone & Cahn, supra note 169. 
 183.  See, e.g., Berger v. Berger, 747 N.W.2d 336, 352–53 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008).   
 184.  Empirical studies show: 1) the public is relatively hostile toward alimony awards to long-
term homemakers whose children have grown up.  See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman & Sanford L. Braver, 
Lay Intuitions About Family Obligations: The Case of Alimony, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 209, 
237 (2012); and 2) women who initiate divorce are reluctant to seek child support.  See Judith G. 
McMullen, Alimony: What Social Science and Popular Culture Tell Us About Women, Guilt, and 
Spousal Support After Divorce, 19 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 41, 47, 69 (2011). 
 185.  See Katharine K. Baker, The Stories of Marriage, 12 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 49–50 (2010). 
 186.  Alicia Brokars Kelly, Money Matters in Marriage: Unmasking Interdependence in Ongo-
ing Spousal Economic Relations, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 113, 116 (2008). 
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C.  Parentage and Marriage 
States have remade the relationship between parents and children to en-
force more egalitarian principles of caretaking.  Traditional marriage associ-
ated children’s interests with a breadwinning father and a caretaking mother 
who performed complementary roles.187  In the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury, courts recognized a presumption in favor of maternal custody for chil-
dren of “tender years.”188  They also presumed that if parents could not co-
operate sufficiently to stay married, they were unlikely to be able to parent 
together after a divorce.189  Accordingly, just as the law gave husbands uni-
lateral decisionmaking authority over the family’s assets, the law also in-
sisted on recognition of a single custodial parent and accorded the other par-
ent “visitation” if that parent enjoyed any right to see the child at all.  Divided 
parental authority was thought to be inimical to children’s interests.190 
With the adoption of no-fault divorce and the dramatic increase in di-
vorce rates, a continuation of the maternal presumption would have meant 
that a young woman would be able to leave her husband, with the children in 
tow, and demand that he provide financial support through the children’s age 
of majority.191  In the name of gender equality, men fought for and won in-
creasing recognition of gender neutral custody rights and a presumption that 
it was in children’s interests to retain contact with both parents.192  Parenting 
                                                          
 187.  Indeed, same-sex marriage opponents have often invoked the importance of complemen-
tary sex-based roles in children’s development.  See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Risky Arguments in So-
cial-Justice Litigation: The Case of Sex Discrimination and Marriage Equality, 114 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2087, 2153 (2014) (discussing—and debunking—such claims). 
 188.  See DiFonzo, supra note 118, at 228. 
 189.  See, e.g., McLemore v. McLemore, 346 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961) (stating 
divided custody “would be greatly to the detriment of the children, because it would give them no 
fixed or permanent home, but rather keep them unsettled and on the move.  Nothing can be more 
demoralizing to a home or destructive to good citizenship . . . .” (quoting Towles v. Towles, 195 
S.W. 437, 438 (Ky. Ct. App. 1917))); McCann v. McCann, 167 Md. 167, 171–73, 173 A. 7, 9 (1934) 
(noting that the decree in question “divided the control of the child, which is to be avoided, when-
ever possible, as an evil fruitful in the destruction of discipline, in the creation of distrust, and in the 
production of mental distress in the child”); Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121, 130 (N.D. 1980) (as-
sociating shared custody with lax discipline); DeForest v. DeForest, 228 N.W.2d 919, 925 (N.D. 
1975) (discussing the need for stability); Martin v. Martin, 132 S.W.2d 426, 428 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1939) (“It is readily apparent that such practices are calculated to arouse serious emotional conflicts 
in the mind of the child . . . .”). 
 190.  JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS 
OF THE CHILD 32, 34, 38 (1973) (stressing the importance of deferral to the custodial parent). 
 191.  See McMullen, supra note 184 (discussing women’s feelings of guilt about initiating di-
vorce as a factor in lack of alimony awards); see also JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN B. KELLY, 
SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: HOW CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 23 (1996) (noting 
that the party initiating divorce is likely to ask for less financial support). 
 192.  DiFonzo, supra note 118, at 216 (stating that almost all states have adopted policies favor-
ing the child’s continuing contact with both parents); Dinner, supra note 116.  
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is no longer thought to depend on unique male or female attributes;193 rather, 
children’s interests are thought to lie with the stability of their relationships 
with the two adults who assume responsibility for their care.194 
1.  Determining Parentage 
The equal assumption of responsibility for children starts with the mar-
ital presumption.  The marital presumption makes parentage an “opt-out” sta-
tus.  The presumption, both legally and practically, is that children born to a 
married woman are the children of the two spouses.195  Neither spouse need 
take any action for both to receive recognition as parents, and their legal sta-
tus continues unless someone takes action to challenge this status.196  In many 
states, even proof that the husband is not the biological father does not solely 
rebut the presumption; instead, doing so may involve the consideration of the 
child’s interests, the degree to which the husband assumed a paternal role, 
and/or the biological father’s ability and willingness to provide support.197 
Historically, the marital presumption served to confer fatherhood on a 
husband.  It began as a presumption of biology that could only be rebutted 
through proof that the husband had not fathered his wife’s child.198  In fact, 
in the era that treated marriage as an institution designed to unite biology and 
parenthood, the marital presumption served as something of a fig leaf that, 
when necessary, could cover up inconvenient facts of reproduction in order 
to preserve the illusion of a biological family.199  As a practical matter, it 
                                                          
 193.  But see Clifford J. Rosky, Like Father, Like Son: Homosexuality, Parenthood, and the 
Gender of Homophobia, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 257, 343 (2009) (arguing that gender stereo-
types survive, despite gender neutral custody presumptions, and have a disproportionate impact on 
gay fathers). 
 194.  Within marriage, this still means two and only two adults.  For discussion of the possibility 
of three adults, see Yehezkel Margalit et. al., The New Frontier of Advanced Reproductive Technol-
ogy: Reevaluating Modern Legal Parenthood, 37 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 107 (2014); Nancy D. 
Polikoff, Response: And Baby Makes . . . How Many? Using In re M.C. to Consider Parentage of 
a Child Conceived Through Sexual Intercourse and Born to a Lesbian Couple, 100 GEO. L.J. 2015, 
2026 (2012). 
 195.  See, e.g., NeJaime, supra note 72.  
 196.  See generally Carbone & Cahn, supra note 74 (discussing operation of the marital pre-
sumption). 
 197.  See generally Harris, supra note 102, at 1300 (noting the role of marital presumption in 
protecting the relationship between husband and child). 
 198.  E.g., Carbone & Cahn, supra note 74; June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage and the 
Marital Presumption Post-Obergefell, 84 UMKC L. REV. 663, 667 (2016). 
 199.  It not only made parenthood for the married automatic, it also restricted those who could 
challenge the presumption (unmarried fathers typically did not have standing to establish paternity) 
and the testimony that could be used to rebut the husband’s paternity (testimony about the wife’s 
sexual behavior was not allowed).  See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 74. 
CarboneCahnFinalBookProof 10/31/2016  3:22 PM 
88 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:55 
restricted the evidence that could be used to rebut the presumption200 and thus 
preserved marital unity and protected the husband who assumed a paternal 
role, whatever the facts of his biological relationship to the child.201 
Thus, if a married couple were to leave the hospital and get into an au-
tomobile accident on the way home, the husband would be a legal parent who 
could make medical decisions for the child even if his name did not appear 
on the birth certificate and he had taken no other action to affirm his paternity.  
Indeed, even if both parents knew that someone else had fathered the child, 
and even if the hospital had on record DNA tests that showed that the husband 
could not have fathered the child, his legal status as a parent would be unaf-
fected unless someone challenged the presumption.202  The marital presump-
tion thus takes the form of an opt-out condition of marriage—presumed un-
less proven otherwise. 
With the ability of same-sex couples to wed, the courts have had to de-
cide whether the marital presumption applies to a couple who could not have 
jointly produced the child and, if so, what the presumption means theoreti-
cally and practically.  Most of the cases decided to date have taken the posi-
tion that the opt-out system applies to same-sex parents.203  As a practical 
matter, this means that the opt-out system used for different-sex couples often 
                                                          
 200.  Typically, marital presumption statutes have denied standing to the biological father to 
establish paternity, and precluded testimony about a wife’s infidelity or sexual relations with a hus-
band present in the household.  See Theresa Glennon, Somebody’s Child: Evaluating the Erosion of 
the Marital Presumption of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 547, 573, 564 (2000).   
 201.  Indeed, Michael H. upheld the continued constitutionality of the marital presumption in 
1989, in part because of the importance of the marital family as a functional unit.  See Michael H. 
v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 119–20 (1989). 
 202.  While all states continue to apply the marital presumption to couples in intact marriages 
(where there is no effort to rebut it), they differ in how they apply it at divorce.  In Pennsylvania, 
for example, the marital presumption does not apply at all at divorce, allowing either parent to con-
test the parentage of a child born into the marriage.  Pennsylvania then determines financial respon-
sibility in accordance with estoppel principles.  States also vary in their willingness to allow mothers 
to challenge the parental status of a husband who wishes to continue in a parental role.  And, all 
states are more willing to entertain such challenges from either a husband or a wife, where the 
biological father is interested in assuming a parental role after the divorce.  See, e.g., In re Waites, 
152 So. 3d 306 (Miss. 2014). 
 203.  See Barse v. Pasternak, No. HHBFA124030541S, 2015 WL 600973, at *1  (Conn. Super. 
Ct. Jan. 16, 2015); Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335 (Iowa 2013); K.S. v. 
G.S., 440 A.2d 64 (N.J. 1981); Wendy G-M. v. Erin G-M., 985 N.Y.S.2d 845, 861 (N.Y.  2014); In 
re Baby Doe, 353 S.E.2d 877 (S.C. 1987); Roe v. Patton, No. 2:15-CV-00253-DB, 2015 WL 
4476734, at *2 (D. Utah July 22, 2015).  At least one jurisdiction has gone so far as to change its 
parentage statute to apply the preemption explicitly to same-sex couples.  See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-
909(a-1)(2) (2015) (“There shall be a presumption that a woman is the mother of a child if she and 
the child’s mother are or have been married, or in a domestic partnership, at the time of either con-
ception or birth, or between conception or birth, and the child is born during the marriage or domes-
tic partnership . . . .”); see also Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own 
Child: Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty–First Century, 5 STAN. J. 
C.R. & C.L. 201, 247 (2009) (noting consideration or enactment of similar statutes elsewhere). 
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applies to same-sex couples; consequently, two same-sex partners would au-
tomatically be treated as parents of a child, without having to adopt or take 
some other action to establish legal parenthood. 
This result reinforces marriage as an institution that presumes the 
spouses undertake shared and equal commitments to the children they pro-
duce as part of the union—even without a biological tie.  If the presumption 
were not applicable to same-sex spouses, the parent without a biological or 
adoptive tie would become a step-parent, a legal role that is distinctly sec-
ondary to that of the other spouse.  Instead, application of the marital pre-
sumption assumes that by marrying, each spouse consents to the assumption 
of joint and equal parental roles. 
2.  Determining Custody 
Custody for all children turns on a best interest of the child standard that 
appears to require that courts tailor custodial arrangements based on the spe-
cific circumstances of each case.  In fact, courts decide custody in accordance 
with general presumptions about children’s interests, and today these pre-
sumptions identify the child’s interests with the continuing involvement of 
both parents.204  As a practical matter, courts will not enter a divorce decree 
without listing the children born into the marriage and entering a custodial 
order, and these orders increasingly provide for time with both parents.205  
Continuing contact can take the form of joint physical and/or legal custody, 
parenting plans, or other orders that allocate shares of the child’s time and 
parental decisionmaking authority.206 
Shared custody, rather than selection of a sole custodian, has become 
the norm.207  Although it was once dismissed as unworkable, it is now avail-
able in some form in all states, and has become the preferred outcome in some 
jurisdictions, absent a showing of “detriment” to the child.208  Even when a 
                                                          
 204.  See DiFonzo, supra note 118, at 217, 225; see also N.H. REV. STAT. § 461-A:6(f)–(g) 
(2015); Schwieterman v. Schwieterman, 114 So. 3d 984, 986–87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (“It is 
the public policy of this state that each minor child has frequent and continuing contact with both 
parents after the parents separate . . . to share the rights and responsibilities, and joys, of childrear-
ing.” (quoting 2009 Fla. Laws Ch. 2009-180 § 3, at 1853)); Charts, 48 FAM. L.Q. 654, 656 (2015) 
(depicting custody criteria in Chart 2). 
 205.  See BROWN & COOK, supra note 141, at 2, 9–12, 18–19; Maria Cancian et al., Who Gets 
Custody Now? Dramatic Changes in Children’s Living Arrangements After Divorce, 51 
DEMOGRAPHY 1381 (2014). 
 206.  See, e.g., HARRIS ET AL., supra note 76, at 570–89. 
 207.  See Theresa Glennon, Still Partners? Examining the Consequences of Post-Dissolution 
Parenting, 41 FAM. L.Q. 105, 114 (2007).  Indeed, “[d]ivorced fathers were among the chief sup-
porters of the California joint custody statute that became effective in 1980, ten years after the no-
fault divorce law . . . .”  Herma Hill Kay, No-Fault Divorce and Child Custody: Chilling Out the 
Gender Wars, 36 FAM. L.Q. 27, 36 (2002).  
 208.  See, e.g., ARK. CODE  § 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2015) (“an award of shared custody is fa-
vored in Arkansas”); N.H. REV. STAT. § 461-A:5 (2015) (establishing a presumption in favor of 
joint decisionmaking responsibility); Cuadra, supra note 147, at 641 (listing joint custody statutes); 
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court awards one parent primary custody, it may still be required to grant a 
minimum number of visitation days to the other parent.209 
National custody statistics are not available, but studies of child custody 
suggest a growing trend towards shared custody.210  As a national task force 
declared in 2014, “[t]he most significant trend in contemporary child custody 
law is toward greater active involvement by both parents in postseparation 
childrearing.”211  Fathers’ rights groups continue to press further for a pre-
sumption in favor of an equal division of the child’s time in all divorces, and, 
even without such a presumption, some courts try to equalize the time spent 
with each parent when it is practicable.212 
Moreover, many states that may not have an explicit preference for 
shared custody favor a custody award to the parent most likely to facilitate 
the continued involvement of the other parent.213  These “friendly parent” 
provisions give courts the ability to threaten parents who obstruct the other 
parent’s involvement with loss of custody,214 and the number of reported 
opinions transferring custody from mothers to fathers on this basis has in-
creased.215 
                                                          
DiFonzo, supra note 118, at 217 (“Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have statutory 
provisions authorizing courts to award joint custody in one form or another (legal or physical),” and 
the other three do so by case law).  States differ, however, about whether the preference extends just 
to joint legal custody, which refers to joint decisionmaking, or to both joint legal and physical cus-
tody.  In addition, some states have moved away from the joint custody, sole custody, and visitation 
vocabulary in favor of parenting plans or other forms of cooperative custody.  DiFonzo, supra note 
118, at 216–18.  
 209.  E.g., UTAH CODE § 30-3-35 (2015) (establishing a “[m]inimum schedule for parent-time 
for children 5 to 18 years of age”).   
 210.  WOMEN’S LAW CTR. OF MD., FAMILIES IN TRANSITION: A FOLLOW-UP STUDY 
EXPLORING FAMILY LAW ISSUES IN MARYLAND 35–36 (2006), http://www.wlcmd.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2013/06/Families-in-Transition.pdf (showing that between 1999 and 2003, “Maryland 
parents [were] sharing decisionmaking in more than half the cases—55 percent—and with greater 
frequency”). 
 211.  Marsha Kline Pruett & J. Herbie DiFonzo, Closing the Gap: Research, Policy, Practice 
and Shared Parenting, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 152, 156 (2014). 
 212.  For a discussion of these movements and the objections to them, see Margaret F. Brinig, 
Penalty Defaults in Family Law: The Case of Child Custody, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779, 781–82 
(2006); Dinner, supra note 192; Arnett Dugan, In Mass. and Elsewhere, a Push for Custody Reform, 
BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 1, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/07/31/massachusetts-and-
elsewhere-push-for-child-custody-reform/Xh4NOwx2qWyZ12VMuYPf9J/story.html.  See also 
Schwieterman v. Schwieterman, 114 So. 3d 984, 986–87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (upholding an 
award of equal time to each parent without a statutory mandate). 
 213.  See DiFonzo, supra note 118, at 217, 225.  
 214.  See, e.g., ARK. CODE. § 9-13-101(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2015) (providing that when a “parent 
demonstrates a pattern of willfully creating conflict in an attempt to disrupt a current or pending 
joint-custody arrangement,” the court can modify a joint custody award “to an order of primary 
custody to the nondisruptive parent”). 
 215.  See, e.g., In re Mannion, 917 A.2d 1272, 1275–76 (N.H. 2007). 
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Sharing custody has won widespread public and judicial support.216  For 
example, a survey of Indiana family court judges found that, while only four 
percent preferred joint custody in 1998, only twenty percent or less did not 
prefer it in 2011.217  This acceptance goes beyond the legal system.  When 
participants in an innovative study were asked to allocate parenting time upon 
divorce, they strongly preferred equal awards of the child’s time to each par-
ent, irrespective of each parent’s involvement with the child during the mar-
riage or the existence of conflict between the parents during the divorce.  
Study participants expressed significant reservations only when one of the 
parents had instigated the conflict.218 
3.  Conclusion 
These changes have reshaped marriage.  Today, it has become a union 
for the financially stable and mature.219  The husband no longer solely gen-
erates the family income with the legal authority to determine how it will be 
spent; instead, both spouses have the obligation to support each other and the 
need to cooperate in managing the family’s assets.220  Similarly, wives are no 
longer expected to take responsibility for children with little input from their 
husbands.  Today’s marital ideal requires coordinating homework supervi-
sion, doctor’s visits, daycare pickup, and after school activities.  And if a split 
                                                          
 216.  L. Braver et al., Lay Judgments About Child Custody After Divorce, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 212 (2011); see also Glennon, supra note 207, at 113–14; Linda Nielsen, Shared Par-
enting After Divorce: A Review of Shared Residential Parenting Research, 52 J. DIVORCE & 
REMARRIAGE 586 (2011); Results of Local, Regional Ballot Questions, BOS. GLOBE (2004), 
http://www.boston.com/news/special/politics/2004_results/general_election/ques-
tions_all_by_town.htm (discussing a proposition in favor of shared parenting which passed with 
overwhelming support). 
 217.  Julie E. Artis & Andrew V. Krebs, Family Law and Social Change: Judicial Views of Joint 
Custody, 1998–2011, 40 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 723, 734 (2015) (finding that in 1998, only 4% 
favored shared custody, regardless of the age of the child; in 2011, 92% favored shared custody for 
children ages five to twelve, and 80% favored shared custody for children from birth to age four 
and ages thirteen to eighteen). 
 218.  Braver et al., supra note 216, at 236.  Follow-up studies reaffirmed the basic intuitions 
about a strong preference for shared custody, but also found less of an inclination to award equal 
time to both parents where one had caused the breakup because of an affair or an unjustified decision 
to leave the marriage.  Ashley M. Votruba et al., Moral Intuitions About Fault, Parenting, and Child 
Custody After Divorce, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 251, 256 (2014).  Even then, most partici-
pants continued to favor awarding each parent substantial time with the child. 
 219.  Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, Cohabitation and the Uneven Retreat from Marriage 
in the U.S., 1950–2010 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, NBER Working Paper No. 19413, 2013), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19413 (discussing that a two parent investment is necessary for to-
day’s children to reach middle class status). 
 220.  Public attitudes show declining support for the traditional hierarchical family and increas-
ing support for equal roles of caretaking and breadwinning in marriage, although women still be-
lieve that a man is not ready for marriage until he can provide economic support to his family.  The 
Decline of Marriage and Rise of New Families, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 16, 2010), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2010/11/18/the-decline-of-marriage-and-rise-of-new-families/6/.  
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does occur, both parents are expected to support the other’s continuing par-
ticipation as an equal in the child’s life.221 
The costs of attachment to an unreliable partner have accordingly in-
creased.222  Equality within marriage involves the re-creation of the institu-
tion as an interdependent economic union and one of shared and co-equal 
assumption of parental responsibilities.223  Both spouses, therefore, have rea-
son to be wary of unreliable partners who do not carry their own weight in a 
relationship.224  This remaking of marriage along principles of equality does 
not allow spouses complete freedom to tailor the terms of marriage to their 
preferences.  While they have greater ability to enter into premarital agree-
ments that alter the financial terms of the union, the enforceability of provi-
sions altering parental rights and obligations is limited.225  Accordingly, the 
championing of marriage equality as equality between spouses involves some 
restriction on autonomy.226  Marriage remains an institution whose content 
comes from strong social and legal norms, not just from the agreement of the 
spouses.227 
Ultimately, the dismantling of traditional marriage, which rested on the 
twin foundations of inequality and coercion,228 has both redefined marriage 
in accordance with principles of equality and given adults more freedom to 
choose marital or nonmarital relationships.229  The newest challenges to mar-
riage equality center on the treatment of the differences between marriage 
                                                          
 221.  See, e.g., HARRIS ET AL., supra note 76, at 626. 
 222.  See ROBERT D. PUTNAM ET AL., GROWING CLASS GAPS IN SOCIAL CONNECTEDNESS 
AMONG AMERICAN YOUTH, 1975–2009 10 (2012), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/saguaro/pdfs/Sa-
guaroReport_DivergingSocialConnectedness.pdf.  See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, OUR KIDS: 
THE AMERICAN DREAM IN CRISIS (2015) (documenting disparity in child outcomes based on family 
income).   
 223.  See Cynthia Lee Starnes, Lovers, Parents, and Partners: Disentangling Spousal and Co-
Parenting Commitments, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 197, 199, 230–31 (2012) (arguing that family law should 
treat marriage as both a spousal and a co-parenting commitment). 
 224.  See CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 79.   
 225.  See, e.g., HARRIS ET AL., supra note 76, at 675. 
 226.  Although spouses do have greater ability to enter into premarital agreements addressing 
their financial obligations, they cannot alter custody and child support obligations.  See id.  
 227.  Cherlin, supra note 156 (explaining that institutionalization comes from the establishment 
and reinforcement of institutions such as marriage that create shared expectations about acceptable 
behavior). 
 228.  See supra Part II.A. 
 229.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (noting the egalitarian nature of 
marriage); MARTHA M. ERTMAN, LOVE’S PROMISES: HOW FORMAL AND INFORMAL CONTRACTS 
SHAPE ALL KINDS OF FAMILIES 109 (2015) (addressing marital and nonmarital relationships). 
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and nonmarriage.230  The privileged role of marriage in the law—a privileg-
ing celebrated by Justice Kennedy throughout Obergefell231—makes efforts 
to respect nonmarriage, on its own terms, even more significant and poten-
tially more difficult.232 
III.  MARRYING AND NOT MARRYING 
Given the changes in the nature of marriage, and the decisions of large 
numbers of intimate partners to cohabit or bear children together without 
marrying, the time has come to address the question of whether nonmarriage 
should be recognized as a separate status and, if so, what that status entails.  
The Supreme Court, culminating in Obergefell, has opened up marriage to 
those previously excluded from the institution.  As a result, not being married 
becomes a choice rather than, as was true for same-sex couples before Ober-
gefell, the only option.  Lawrence v. Texas and earlier decisions, for example, 
decriminalized nonmarital relationships, helping to make nonmarriage in-
creasingly accepted.  As a result, not marrying becomes a choice.  Moreover, 
as the nature of marriage has changed, so too have the nature of the choices 
underlying such decisions.  With the reform of marriage into an institution 
premised on formal equality, those who see their relationships as involving 
an unequal division of contributions and benefits have become more likely 
not to marry.  As a result, more people are choosing not to get married, and 
the reasons they choose not to have changed.  We should respect nonmarriage 
as a separate legal status in its own right. 
In considering nonmarriage in these terms, it is important to contrast the 
two systems, acknowledging not just existing legal differences, but the rea-
sons the parties choose between them in the first place.  In this Part, we ex-
plore three such considerations that should be central in shaping the law of 
nonmarriage. 
The first difference is that married couples know what is customary 
when they legalize their relationship while unmarried couples are often mak-
ing it up as they go along.  Marriage is an institution that reinforces shared 
                                                          
 230.  Indeed, the issue that has received the greatest attention from the Supreme Court involves 
consent to adoption.  The claims of fathers to equal rights with mothers have received considerable 
attention in the context of adoption decisions, where either one party’s inclination (for example, the 
mother’s desire to place the child for adoption) or the other’s (for example, the father’s preference 
for raising the child himself) can prevail.  See, e.g., Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 
(2013); In re Adoption of J.S., 358 P.3d 1009 (Utah 2014), cert. denied sub nom., Bolden v. Doe, 
136 S. Ct. 31 (2015). 
 231.  E.g., Mayeri, supra note 170, at 134 (Obergefell does not reflect feminist campaigns 
“against discrimination based on nonmarital status”); Tait, supra note 170 (critiquing the majority’s 
vision of marriage). 
 232.  See KATHERINE FRANKE, WEDLOCKED: THE PERILS OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY (2015); 
R.A. Lenhardt, Marriage as Black Citizenship?, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1317, 1358 (2015) (“[M]arriage 
need not be the only, or even the primary, frame for supporting black loving relationships.”). 
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expectations about what it means to marry, even if the spouses do not know 
each of the 1,000-plus state-provided benefits accorded to marriage or all of 
the laws on dissolution and death.  Nonmarriage is not one single institution, 
but instead is a continuum of relationships.233  It simultaneously allows cou-
ples greater room to work out arrangements of their choice and involves 
fewer societal mechanisms that help unmarried couples reach agreement 
about what their relationship means.  Unmarried couples are therefore less 
likely than married couples to agree on the terms of their individual unions. 
The second difference is that married couples make an unqualified com-
mitment to each other—for better or worse, in sickness and in health—while 
unmarried couples typically make a more contingent one.  When couples 
search for a marital partner, they are looking for a true life partner, one who 
complements their vision of what a good life entails.234  Cohabitants, in con-
trast, often lack similar confidence in their partners or in the existence of cir-
cumstances that will allow the relationship to flourish.  While marriage there-
fore rests on a system that assumes a high degree of integration of the 
couples’ lives, nonmarriage involves a series of choices about whether to 
jointly title property, maintain separate bank accounts, put both parties’ 
names on a lease, or otherwise assume responsibility for the other person’s 
affairs. 
The third difference is that marriage involves institutionalized expecta-
tions of equality.  The law assumes equal contributions to marriage, typically 
divides property equally, and assumes that the child’s interests lie with the 
relatively equal involvement of both parents following a break-up.  Couples 
who do not see themselves as equal, who do not want an equal division of 
assets or responsibilities, or who do not trust the other partner to deliver on 
promises of equality, often do not marry for these reasons.  Nonmarriage al-
lows them to define their relationships on something closer to their own 
terms, even if that means unequal terms. 
                                                          
 233.  Because nonmarriage describes a continuum of relationships, its definition is somewhat 
imprecise.  Nonetheless, for purposes of this Article, we use the term to mean the minimum rela-
tionship between intimate partners necessary to trigger a claim of legal obligations from one to the 
other.  The term thus does not include roommates, co-workers, or business partners who do not have 
an intimate relationship with each other, but it does include intimate partners who undertake joint 
business ventures or who commingle their finances whether or not they cohabit.  It also includes 
those unmarried partners who raise a child together (with or without a biological relationship) or 
who have had a child together, even if their only tie is the sexual act that produced the child.  And, 
it includes those who enter into formal legal “nonmarriage” statuses.  See, e.g., Kaiponanea T. 
Matsumura, A Right Not to Marry, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1509, 1515 (2016). 
 234.  Maura Kelly, How We Meet Our Spouses, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 27, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303325204579463272000371990 (asserting that 
most Americans want to find soul mates); see also Wendy Wang & Kim Parker, Record Share of 
Americans Have Never Married, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (2014), http://www.pewsocial-
trends.org/2014/09/24/record-share-of-americans-have-never-married/ (finding that a majority of 
those looking for a partner want someone with similar ideas about children—although having the 
same moral beliefs is less important). 
CarboneCahnFinalBookProof 10/31/2016  3:22 PM 
2016] NONMARRIAGE 95 
A.  Formality and Shared Expectations 
Marriage and divorce require deliberate decisions to enter into and out 
of a state-sanctioned status.  Unmarried partners, on the other hand, may enter 
and leave relationships without formalities and often without explicit markers 
commemorating the changing status of a relationship.  These differences in-
fluence the relationship between norms, the couple’s own understandings 
about their relationships, and the law. 
Outside of the small number of common law marriage states,235 mar-
riage requires obtaining a license and conducting a ceremony.236  Divorce in 
all states for any marriage (including a common law marriage) requires a ju-
dicial proceeding that produces a court order effecting the change in status.  
These formalities, which can be expensive and time consuming, provide an 
opportunity for the parties to ponder and plan for their change in marital sta-
tus. 
In contrast, unmarried couples often drift into cohabitation without ei-
ther a clear plan or distinct understandings about their relationships.237  The 
lack of formalities correlates not just with a lack of planning for the relation-
ship, but with a greater likelihood that the couple may not share expectations 
about their future together.238  For example, cohabiting males are signifi-
cantly less likely than cohabiting females to report that they “love . . . [their] 
partner a lot” or to view the relationship as a committed one.239  On the other 
hand, there are no significant differences between male and female spouses 
on these measures.240  In some cases, the decision to move in together is jus-
                                                          
 235.  Nine states and the District of Columbia still recognize common law marriage.  Common 
law marriage states require an intent to be married, cohabitation, and a holding out to the community 
that the couple is married.  See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 76, at 235; ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 
7, at 146–57. 
 236.  ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 7, at 130 (noting that all but the common law marriage states 
typically require a license and a ceremony).  
 237.  Kathryn Edin, Paula England, & Kathryn Linnenberg, Love and Distrust Among Unmar-
ried Parents, Presentation at the National Poverty Center Conference 6–7 (2003) (unpublished man-
uscript), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Kathryn_Edin/publication/246728505_Love_ 
and_Distrust_Among_Unmarried_Parents/links/558aed4808ae31beb1003ab0.pdf (indicating that 
unmarried couples who cohabit before the birth of a child often did so though drift, while couples 
who cohabitate after the birth of a child may do so because they believe they should live as a family); 
accord, ISABEL V. SAWHILL, GENERATION UNBOUND: DRIFTING INTO SEX AND PARENTHOOD 
WITHOUT MARRIAGE (2013). 
 238.  Sharon Sassler & Amanda J. Miller, Waiting to Be Asked: Gender, Power, and Relation-
ship Progression Among Cohabiting Couples, 32 J. FAM. ISSUES 482, 499 (2011) (“Cohabitation is 
an ‘incomplete institution’ . . . with few clear guidelines regarding whether and how it should pro-
gress.”). 
 239.  Michael S. Pollard & Kathleen Mullan Harris, Cohabitation and Marriage Intensity: Con-
solidation, Intimacy, and Commitment 13 (RAND Labor & Population, Working Paper No. WR-
1001, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2284457. 
 240.  Id. at 12–13.  
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tified by convenience; it is cheaper to maintain one household than to main-
tain two.241  The dissolution of cohabiting relationships is even more basic: 
one of the parties moves out.  Indeed, one of the reasons cohabiting couples 
give for not marrying is the ease of ending the relationship.242 
The lack of formal legal process may contribute to the persistence of 
varying expectations among cohabitants.  If a married couple wishes to end 
their relationship, they must go to court.  The process will involve hiring a 
lawyer or filling out judicial forms that will shape the process.  The parties 
will have to list their children and their assets, and the divorce decree will 
specify the property division, the children’s custodial arrangements, and the 
provision for support.  The professionals involved in the process will com-
municate information about what to expect and will assist the parties in reach-
ing their own agreements, partly by influencing their expectations about what 
is reasonable, and partly by providing counseling, mediation, custodial eval-
uations and financial advice, if needed.243  Marriage law and community 
norms inform the process, while alternative dispute resolution procedures al-
low space for couples to craft individualized resolutions.244  Unmarried cou-
ples need not go to court at all to begin or to end their relationships, and 
therefore, they are much less likely to encounter professionals who will shape 
either their expectations about appropriate norms or assist with the unwind-
ing of their relationships.  Instead, they are unlikely to end up in court unless 
one party feels that the other was unjustly enriched.  For example, parties 
who commingled their finances without express documentation of their re-
spective interests in the property would receive equitable property division if 
they were married, but neither the law nor community norms mandates a clear 
result when the parties are not married.245 
These diverging expectations correspond to different reservations about 
marriage.  Low income women report concern about a commitment to a fi-
nancially unreliable man; these women fear that such commitments may 
                                                          
 241.   Sassler & Miller, supra note 238, at 491 (concluding that “[t]he greater convenience of 
shared living was most often mentioned as a reason that men proposed living together”). 
 242.  Cynthia Grant Bowman, Social Science and Legal Policy: The Case of Heterosexual Co-
habitation, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 12 (2007) (finding that low income women report reluctance to 
marry men they may have to “evict”).  
 243.  Jana B. Singer, Dispute Resolution and the Postdivorce Family: Implications of a Para-
digm Shift, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 363, 364 (2009) (emphasizing the changing role of family courts as 
conflict mangers).  But see Hatcher, supra note 149, at 909–10 (emphasizing the different level of 
resources available to those who cannot afford private attorneys or other professionals). 
 244.  See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). 
 245.  For example, in Cates v. Swain, the parties gave differing accounts of their financial his-
tory, their intent, and their characterizations of various money transfers.  No. 2010–CT–01939–
SCT, 2013 WL 1831783, at *1 (Miss. May 2, 2013) (en banc).  In contrast, had they been married, 
they would have been more likely to put the property in their joint names and the court would have 
equitably divided the investments, which included their principal residence, however they charac-
terized their intent.  
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threaten the resources on which they depend to take care of themselves and 
their children.246  And among cohabitants between the ages of eighteen and 
twenty-nine who have not graduated from high school, women are much less 
likely than men to indicate that they expect to marry their current partner 
(forty-seven percent compared to sixty-seven percent of the men).247  In con-
trast, young, better-educated men are more likely to report concerns about 
relationships holding them back,248 and among cohabitants with at least some 
college completion, the gender differences reverse with sixty-eight percent 
of women and forty-six percent of the men expecting to marry their current 
partner.249   
Unmarried relationships with children may be even more complex.  
“Shotgun cohabitation” has replaced shotgun marriage, with differences that 
correspond to racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic factors.250  The poorer and 
less educated the mother, the more likely the pregnancy was unplanned.251  
While couples have become less likely to marry solely because of the birth 
of their child, they have become more likely to live together and to try to 
create a family, even when the parents did not know each other all that well 
at the time of conception.252  They may have neither clear role expectations 
nor confidence in each other as they do so.253  Again, if the parties do nothing 
at the time of their break-up, the result ratifies the status quo, which would 
typically mean a custodial parent who controls access to the child,254 and a 
non-custodial parent, who is not subject to a formal order of support.  While 
                                                          
 246.  Bowman, supra note 242, at 11. 
 247.  KAY HYMOWITZ ET AL., KNOT YET: THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF DELAYED MARRIAGE 
IN AMERICA 28 (2013), http://nationalmarriageproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/KnotYet-
FinalForWeb.pdf; see also Amanda J. Miller et al., The Specter of Divorce: Views From Working- 
and Middle-Class Cohabitors, 60 FAM. REL. 602, 613 (2011) (observing that “[w]orking-class co-
habitors—particularly the women—were more than twice as likely to express concerns regarding 
how hard marriage was to exit than were middle-class respondents, emphasizing the legal and fi-
nancial challenges of unraveling a marriage”).  
 248.  See, e.g., MARK REGNERUS & JEREMY UECKER, PREMARITAL SEX IN AMERICA: HOW 
YOUNG AMERICANS MEET, MATE, AND THINK ABOUT MARRIAGE 192 (2011) (reporting that am-
bitious men want sex as recreation but are wary about the limitations of more committed relation-
ships). 
 249.  HYMOWITZ ET AL., supra note 247, at 28. 
 250.  Lichter et al., supra note 67, at 135 (referring to shotgun cohabitation as a new form of 
“legitimation”). 
 251.  See NAOMI CAHN ET AL., TWO PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND THE 
FUTURE OF THE FAMILY 11 (2016).  
 252.  Heather Rackin & Christina M. Gibson-Davis, The Role of Pre- and Postconception Rela-
tionships for First-Time Parents, 74 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 526, 527 (2012) (documenting cohabi-
tation as response to, rather than a cause of, pregnancy); see also EDIN & NELSON, supra note 151, 
at 89 (explaining that parents often do not know each other very well at the time a woman becomes 
pregnant). 
 253.  Edin et al., supra note 237, at 6–7 (describing pregnancy as triggering efforts to create a 
family attributing some of the distrust to suspicions of infidelity). 
 254.  See BROWN & COOK, supra note 141, at 18–23 (documenting greater tendency of married 
than unmarried fathers to have custodial order giving them time with the child). 
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the majority of non-custodial parents maintain contact with their children fol-
lowing a break-up, the relationship is less likely to be formalized than in the 
case of divorce.255  In these cases, however, the state may intervene to compel 
issuance of a child support order if the custodial parent is receiving state ben-
efits.256  In state-initiated actions, unlike private divorce proceedings, the par-
ents have little ability to resolve the matter on their own, and the terms the 
courts impose are more likely to reflect state-mandated guidelines than com-
munity norms.257 
Unmarried couples are thus both less likely to enter into their relation-
ships with shared expectations about the relationships’ terms and less likely 
to interact with the legal system in a way that effectively gives voice to the 
understandings they do have.  Nonmarital couples are less likely to go to 
court, less likely to be able to control the outcomes if they do go to court, and 
less likely to be subject to rules that reflect either their personal or their com-
munity expectations about the terms of their relationship.  The law accord-
ingly fails to serve either an iterative process that helps reinforce shared un-
derstandings258 or a proactive dispute resolution process that diffuses conflict 
in accordance with customized resolutions.259 
While this first difference between marriage and nonmarriage is that the 
partners are less likely to agree between themselves on the terms of their 
relationships, the second difference involves something on which they have 
agreed: the definition of marriage. 
                                                          
 255.  See Leslie Joan Harris, Questioning Child Support Enforcement Policy for Poor Families, 
45 FAM. L.Q. 157, 164–66 (2011) (observing that more custodial parents in the Fragile Families 
studies, who are overwhelmingly unmarried, received informal than formal support from noncusto-
dial parents, and that the amount of informal support tended to be greater than that provided through 
formal child support orders). 
 256.  Brustin & Martin, supra note 115, at 804–05. 
 257.  For example, in private actions, the noncustodial parent may seek more time with the child 
as a way of decreasing the support owed, or the custodial parent may decide not to seek support at 
all from a parent with whom she does not wish the child to have a relationship.  In a state-initiated 
action, on the other hand, the state controls the action, and the noncustodial parent would have to 
file an independent action to seek a custodial order.  See id. at 824. 
 258.  See Scott & Scott, supra note 9, at 339–40. 
 259.  See Singer, supra note 243. 
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B.  Contingent Relationships and the Decision Not to Marry 
Both those who marry and those who do not see marriage as an 
institution based on a permanent and unqualified commitment to the other 
partner.260  And, in fact, married relationships are more likely to last.261 
Nonmarriage, in contrast, occurs on a continuum.  Some nonmarital 
unions involve partners who might like to marry and cannot, such as same-
sex couples in the pre-Obergefell era, or couples who face financial penalties 
if they do.262  Others who can marry choose not to do so because they do not 
believe in the institution.263  These couples often think of themselves as fully 
committed to each other and may have commingled their lives in ways that 
are indistinguishable from married couples.  And, the majority of people who 
live together increasingly commingle their affairs as time passes.  Although, 
the number who report that they are “completely committed” to each other 
neither changes over time nor resembles the substantially greater reported 
commitment levels of married couples.264 
Instead, many unmarried couples see their relationships as contingent, 
that is, as an agreement to stay together so long as they both wish to do so.  
While some couples treat cohabitation as a form of “trial marriage,” to see 
whether or not they are compatible, for others, a decision to move in together 
may have simply been a matter of convenience—a way to save money or to 
find a place to stay in a new city.265  Cohabitation per se does not necessarily 
signal mutual understandings about either a relationship change or agreement 
to particular terms, such as a shared bank account.266  As a general matter, 
                                                          
 260.  Pollard & Harris, supra note 239, at 14 (observing that “cohabitors are . . . substantially 
less certain about the permanence of their relationships than respondents in married relationships, 
and they report substantially lower levels of ‘complete’ commitment to their partner, especially for 
males” while “married relationships of any duration consistently ranked higher on all of the intensity 
measures than cohabitations at even the longer durations”); see also Miller et al., supra note 247, at 
607.  
 261.  See DONALD BRAMAN, DOING TIME ON THE OUTSIDE: INCARCERATION AND FAMILY 
LIFE IN URBAN AMERICAN 95 (2007) (reporting that “many wives of prisoners said that they would 
have left their partners had they not been married to them”); Sara McLanahan & Audrey N. Beck, 
Parental Relationships in Fragile Families, 20 FUTURE CHILD. 17, 21 (2010) (for black families in 
the study, the dissolution rate five years after birth was 73% for cohabitants and 46% for marriage; 
for whites, it was 65% for cohabitants, and 17% for marriages). 
 262.  See, e.g., Brustin & Martin, supra note 115; Lenhardt, supra note 232.  
 263.  See, e.g., NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE 3, 19 (2008); 
NeJaime, supra note 3, at 105.  A sizeable minority of the LGBT community believes same-sex 
marriage advocacy has assumed too high a priority.  Jens Manuel Krogstad, What LGBT Americans 
Think of Same-Sex Marriage, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 2 (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.pewre-
search.org/fact-tank/2015/01/27/what-lgbt-americans-think-of-same-sex-marriage/. 
 264.  Pollard & Harris, supra note 240, at 12.  Married couples, in contrast, show more commit-
ment from the beginning of the relationship and less variation over time.  Id. 
 265.  Sassler & Miller, supra note 238, at 491, 493. 
 266.  Id. at 494–95 (indicating that to the extent the couples in the study had discussed marriage, 
it had been after they moved in together, in some cases because the decision to move in happened 
quickly). 
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these partners may wish to marry someday,267 but they clearly distinguish 
between married and unmarried relationships and are generally not ready to 
make an unqualified commitment to their current partner.268 
Unmarried couples are less likely than married couples to commingle 
their assets.269  In some cases, that may be because the couple has not yet 
made a commitment to each other, but in other cases the couple may be un-
willing to make that commitment because of a lack of trust.  Some unmarried 
couples report directly that they do not trust the other partner, or do not be-
lieve that they can manage interdependent finances.270  Many women report 
that they will not marry a man who cannot hold a steady job.271  For many, 
the issue is practical.  Women see themselves as assuming primary responsi-
bility for children, and if a man is not pulling his own weight in the relation-
ship, he may detract from the woman’s ability to provide for herself and the 
children.  As one woman in a national study explained, she worries that mar-
riage might lead to “a financially ruinous divorce,” particularly because she 
earns more than her partner.272  She observed that if a break-up occurs while 
they are nonmarital partners, “we don’t have to divide anything up.  What’s 
yours is yours, and what’s mine is mine, and that’s it.”273  Other women sim-
ilarly note that they did not want to be part of “the financial ‘drama’” they 
identify with marriage, especially given the high divorce rates in their com-
munities.274  And men similarly identify marriage with the willingness to 
make a greater financial commitment to their partners.275  Yet, couples who 
                                                          
 267.  In the United States, most people continue to express positive views about marriage and 
express a desire to marry.  Those who are not married are likely to say that it is because they have 
not met the right person.  Wang & Parker, supra note 234 (explaining the reasoning of those who 
are not yet married but would like to do so).  Nonetheless, working class couples express greater 
skepticism about making marriage work than middle class couples.  See Miller et al., supra note 
247, at 613 (reporting class differences in attitudes toward divorce); see also Amanda Jayne Miller 
& Sharon Sassler, The Construction of Gender Among Working-Class Cohabiting Couples, 35 
QUALITATIVE SOC. 427, 443 (2012) (indicating that women who were the primary wage-earners 
were more reluctant to marry). 
 268.  Pollard & Harris, supra note 239, at 14 (observing that “married relationships of any dura-
tion consistently ranked higher on all of the intensity measures than cohabitations at even the longer 
durations” and reporting differences in commitment levels). 
 269.  Addo & Sassler, supra note 68, at 411 (concluding that married couples are more likely to 
pool income). 
 270.  As discussed earlier, in Arneault v. Arneault, for example, the court concluded that a 
fifty/fifty division of assets was appropriate even where the married couple lived in different states, 
the wife did not substantially contribute to the business the husband ran in West Virginia, and the 
wife ran her own, much less profitable, business in Michigan.  639 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va. 2006).  In 
contrast, in Simmons v. Samulewicz, the woman chose not to accept a marriage proposal precisely 
because of her wariness of her partner’s finances.  She believed that he could not be a true financial 
partner, and for this reason, she chose not to marry him.  304 P.3d 648 (Haw. Ct. App. 2013). 
 271.  Wang & Parker, supra note 234. 
 272.  WILCOX & WOLFINGER, supra note 151, at 75. 
 273.  Id.  
 274.  Id. at 105. 
 275.  Miller et al., supra note 247, at 613. 
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keep their finances entirely separate report lower satisfaction levels with the 
relationship generally.276 
The commitment to pooled resources has become a defining element of 
marriage, and it also characterizes the more committed nonmarital relation-
ships.277  Yet, for many couples, it has become a principal reason not to 
marry; these couples identify marriage with a commitment to share what they 
see as their resources with a partner, and a major part of what they find dis-
tasteful about divorce are the disputes over the enforcement of that commit-
ment.278  Nonmarriage has become more attractive for many precisely be-
cause it involves no such agreement. 
For unmarried couples with children, the issue of trust is even more crit-
ical.  These couples often report that they are trying to create a family.279  Yet, 
the reasons cohabiting couples give for wariness about marriage and for the 
end of their relationships go to the heart of what should make for a parental 
partnership: conflict, violence, emotional and economic instability, and mis-
trust.280  When poor mothers explain why their relationships with the fathers 
of their children ended, domestic violence is the most significant factor, with 
half of unmarried mothers indicating that it was a factor.281  Moreover, un-
married relationships, in part because they do not involve the same commit-
ment as marriage, are more likely than marriages to end because of sexual 
jealousy or other forms of mistrust.282  Both men and women report suspi-
cions about their partner’s activities. One woman, for example, complained 
that: 
When we got back together [after his infidelity during preg-
nancy] . . . I always checked his pockets because I don’t trust him 
at all.  I did it maybe for a month, then I gave him my trust 
                                                          
 276.  Addo & Sassler, supra note 68, at 408 (indicating that joint accounts correlate with higher 
relationship quality). 
 277.  Id. 
 278.  WILCOX & WOLFINGER, supra note 151, at 75–76. 
 279.  Rackin & Gibson-Davis, supra note 252, at 526. 
 280.  Two-hundred and thirty-seven sociologists report, for example, that “certain conditions—
such as extreme economic marginality, frequent conflict, involvement in crime, incarceration, or 
even infidelity . . .—can be dealt with in a nonmarital union but would virtually mandate a divorce 
if they were married.”  Laura Tach & Kathryn Edin, The Compositional and Institutional Sources 
of Union Dissolution for Married and Unmarried Parents in the United States, 50 DEMOGRAPHY 
1789, 1815 (2013).  “More than one-third of unmarried fathers have been incarcerated, compared 
with less than 10% of married fathers.”  Id. at 1799.  
 281.  KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT 
MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 81, 98 (2005) (asserting that domestic violence is the “chief 
culprit” of ruined relationships). 
 282.  Id. at 81 (covering infidelity and domestic violence); Heather D. Hill, Steppin’ Out: Infi-
delity and Sexual Jealousy Among Unmarried Parents, in UNMARRIED COUPLES WITH CHILDREN 
104 (Paula England & Kathryn Edin eds., 2007); Joanna Reed, Anatomy of the Break-up: How and 
Why Do Unmarried Couples with Children Break-Up?, in UNMARRIED COUPLES WITH CHILDREN, 
supra, at 133. 
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back . . . .  Then he came . . . to the house . . . in a car with two girls 
in it.  Ever since . . . , I just don’t trust him.  Maybe it’s just in my 
head, or maybe it’s not.283 
Men, in turn, report wariness not only about the fidelity of their partners 
but about their partners’ distrust of them.284  The lack of trust contributes to 
an unwillingness to commit completely to a relationship.  While the public 
generally has become more tolerant of nonmarital sexuality, it draws the line 
at adultery.285  Couples unwilling to commit to sexual exclusivity, and those 
who do not trust their partners’ willingness to do so, do not marry. 
These differences in trust and commitment systematically underlie the 
difference between marriage and nonmarriage.  They also frame the differ-
ences between the exceptions and the rules, between what should be default 
rules and custom-crafted exceptions.  In the context of marriage, it makes 
sense for courts to treat the parties as an interdependent unit; after all, spouses 
promise to share their lives together.  In the context of nonmarriage, it simi-
larly makes sense for courts to treat the parties as two independent units who 
have not assumed responsibility for each other after a break-up.  In this set-
ting, parties who wish to make alternative arrangements can contract around 
the default rules or show that one has contributed to the other in ways that 
create an injustice when the relationship ends. 
The anomalies in this system of chosen terms for the nonmarried then 
become the laws of child custody and support.  Even in the context of mar-
riage, the behavior that causes many people not to marry also constitutes a 
reason not to award shared custody.  Every state, for example, mandates con-
sideration of domestic violence in custody awards.286  Moreover, jealousy, 
mistrust, and inability to communicate may be grounds to deny a request for 
joint legal or physical custody.287  And couples who cannot cooperate well 
enough to live together for any period of time 288 may not be able to cooperate 
sufficiently to share custody decisionmaking.289 
                                                          
 283.  Edin et al., supra note 237, at 8. 
 284.  Id. 
 285.  CNN|ORC POLL 4 (2014), http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2014/images/01/06/cnn.orc.poll. 
marijuana.pdf (reporting ninety-three percent of the public is opposed to adultery). 
 286.  Id.; see also HARRIS ET AL., supra note 76, at 614–15 (noting that domestic violence di-
rected at caretakers has been found to be harmful to children, and all states mandate consideration 
of such violence as a factor in custody awards). 
 287.  See, e.g., In re Hansen, 733 N.W. 2d 683 (Iowa 2007). 
 288.  As one prominent study found, although fifty-one percent of unmarried parents were living 
together at the time of the child’s birth, only sixteen percent were married one year later.  SARA 
MCLANAHAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE FAMILIES AND CHILD WELLBEING STUDY: BASELINE 
NATIONAL REPORT (2003), http://www.fragilefamilies.princeton.edu/research_associates.asp.  Of 
the couples that were romantically involved at the time of the child’s birth, only twelve percent 
remained so one year later.  Id. 
 289.  EDIN & NELSON, supra note 151, at 89 (explaining that parents often do not know each 
other very well at the time a woman becomes pregnant, and the low attachment of the father to the 
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Even where disqualifying behavior such as domestic violence is not an 
issue, unmarried couples report that the instability in their lives that comes 
from insecure employment, unstable income, substance abuse, and involve-
ment with the criminal justice system make them wary of the type of com-
mitment marriage entails.290  These same factors make truly shared parenting 
much less likely to work.291 
The question then becomes why apply exactly the same custody laws to 
nonmarriage as those applicable to marriage?  Why not take the same ap-
proach that applies to finances?  The answer may be because of the all or 
nothing nature of parenthood.  Parentage law imposes an all or nothing view 
of parental rights and obligations; it thus confers equal standing on all those 
who can claim the label “parent.”  Yet, nonmarriage is a system that may not 
confer equal status on unmarried partners, either with respect to bank ac-
counts or with respect to children. 
C.  Inequality and Decisions Not to Marry 
This Section turns to the third distinguishing feature of nonmarriage—
inequality—and argues that nonmarriage should be seen as a continuum of 
relationships including many in which the parties do not assume equal posi-
tions with respect to each other.  Indeed, as marriage becomes a system prem-
ised, at least rhetorically, on equality, inequality in assumption of responsi-
bilities becomes a reason not to marry.  In the Mad Men era, executives 
married their secretaries, and executive wives and blue collar wives both took 
care of home and children without much input from their husbands.  Today, 
executives marry fellow executives,292 and many working class women feel 
that they have no choice but to stay in the labor market.  In the present-day, 
marriage is seen, legally and practically, as an exchange among equals.  This 
                                                          
child is often attributed to low attachment to the mother in these cases).  As one study reported, “it 
goes without saying that shared parenting couples must have enough money to provide two house-
holds suitable for children.  Both parents must also have flexible enough work schedules that their 
children can live with them more than a couple of weekends a month.”  Linda Nielsen, Shared 
Residential Custody: Review of the Research (Part I of II), 27 AM. J. FAM. L. 61, 66 (2013). 
 290.  See, e.g., HANNA ROSIN, THE END OF MEN AND THE RISE OF WOMEN 92–93 (2012); 
WILLIAM J. WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR 99 
(1996).  In their 2005 book, sociologists Kathy Edin and Maria Kefalas, for example, quote one 
young woman, a white high school dropout who had a child in her teens with a man who was await-
ing trial: “That’s when I really started [to get better], because I didn’t have to worry about what he 
was doing, didn’t have to worry about him cheating on me, all this stuff.  [It was] then I realized 
that I had to do what I had to do to take care of my son.”  EDIN & KEFELAS, supra note 281, at 194. 
 291.  For the women, already struggling economically, “single parenthood reduces the emotional 
burden and shields them from the type of exploitation that often accompanies the sharing of both 
living arrangements and limited resources.” WILSON, supra note 290, at 105.  Even studies that 
show strong support for joint custody indicate hesitation where a divorce occurs because of one 
party’s misbehavior.  See Ellman & Braver, supra note 184. 
 292.  See Christine R. Schwartz & Robert D. Mare, Trends in Educational Assortative Marriage 
from 1940 to 2003, 42 DEMOGRAPHY 621–46 (2011) (documenting rise in assortative mating). 
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exchange may involve two-career couples who hire others to do the house-
work, or it may involve relatively traditional couples with a primary wage 
earner and a primary caretaker.  In either case, both the men and the women 
see marriage as involving an agreement to share equally, and they want part-
ners who will carry their own weight in a relationship.293 
Moreover, studies of marital quality indicate that these relatively equal 
marriages do better than others for reasons that shed light on decisions not to 
marry.294  They tend to involve two types of marital exchanges consonant 
with the sharing principles applicable at divorce.  The first involve two-career 
couples, where both the man and woman work and share domestic responsi-
bilities.295  In these families, fathers have become much more involved in 
childcare, while the mothers do substantially less housework than their moth-
ers did.296  It helps that with two incomes, the couples can also afford to hire 
more outside help.297  The second group is comprised of traditional couples 
in which the husband earns enough to support the family, and the wife works 
outside the home either part-time or not at all.  These families are also doing 
well, and the law sees these arrangements as ones in which the two spouses 
make different types of contributions that should be equally valued at di-
vorce.298 
                                                          
 293.  As part of this process, both men and women have increased the weight they place on a 
potential spouse’s earnings.  See David M. Buss et al., A Half Century of Mate Preferences: The 
Cultural Evolution of Values, 63 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 491, 501 (2001) (indicating that men’s in-
terest in women’s earnings has increased dramatically since the middle of the twentieth century).  
And male college graduates are more likely to marry fellow graduates, while women are somewhat 
more likely than the men to marry a spouse with less education than they have.  Philip Cohen, 
College Graduates Marry Other College Graduates Most of the Time, ATLANTIC (April 4, 2013), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2013/04/college-graduates-marry-other-college-gradu-
ates-most-of-the-time/274654/.  About half of the women who marry non-grads, however, marry 
men who earn more than they do.  Id. 
 294.  Christine R. Schwartz & Hongyun Han, The Reversal of the Gender Gap in Education and 
Trends in Marital Dissolution, 79 AM. SOC. REV. 605, 623 (2014). 
 295.  AMATO ET AL., supra note 177.  
 296.  See ALISON WOLF, THE XX FACTOR: HOW THE RISE OF WORKING WOMEN HAS CREATED 
A FAR LESS EQUAL WORLD (2013). 
 297.  AMATO ET AL., supra note 177, at 123–24, 141 (describing advantages of being able “to 
afford services, such as high quality child care, take-out meals, and home cleaning, that help to ease 
the family burdens associated with dual employment”); see also Steven L. Nock & Margaret F. 
Brinig, Weak Men and Disorderly Women: Divorce and the Division of Labor, in THE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE & DIVORCE 185, 186–87 (Antony W. Dnes & Robert Rowthorn eds., 
2002) (explaining that greater involvement in traditionally-female housework by either partner is 
associated with higher chances of divorce or separation, though relationships are more stable if the 
husband acknowledges that the wife does more housework and he views the result as unfair). 
 298.  See discussion supra at notes 180–181 and accompanying text.  Of course, the law does 
not always treat these couples in accord with such expectations of valuation.  See Starnes, supra 
note 223, at 203, 210–11.  Cohabiting couples may also view a traditional exchange of male bread-
winning for female homemaking as “equal” and “fair.”  See Miller & Sassler, supra note 267, at 
429. 
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The marriages that have become much less happy—and more divorce 
prone—are those where the husband cannot afford to support the family on 
his own, and the wife, who still assumes the majority of the responsibility for 
the family’s domestic responsibilities, also feels she must work.299  These 
women, who tend to be working class, derive less satisfaction from their jobs 
than true “career women,”300 receive less assistance with either childcare or 
housekeeping from their husbands, and enjoy less decisionmaking authority 
than middle class women who work outside the home.301  Yet, while men still 
tend to earn more than women overall, the gap between spouses is lower (or 
reversed) in these families.  Among families with dual earners, the wife earns 
more than the husband in 70% of marriages in the bottom quintile of families 
in comparison with 34% of wives in families with incomes in the top 20%.302 
Financial realities influence attitudes toward marriage.  Both men and 
women want egalitarian relationships and express reluctance to commit to a 
partner that they believe they will have to support.303  Where one cohabitant 
earns substantially more than the other, or assumes a disproportionate share 
of the responsibilities in the relationship, the sharing principles embedded in 
marriage may be a bad deal.304  And, indeed, many couples do not marry 
because they are hoping to do better.  Unmarried mothers who do not marry 
the fathers of their children, for example, but later form a relationship with a 
different man, typically do so with someone financially better off than the 
father.305 
Decisions not to marry allow couples the ability to order their relation-
ships in accordance with these preferences, though the law permits such re-
sults in different ways for financial and custody matters.  In the context of 
financial arrangements, it accepts as a default that unmarried couples have no 
obligation to each other.  If Lee Marvin wanted to live with Michelle Triola, 
without an obligation to share the results of his movies or provide support, 
he was free to do so absent an express promise to the contrary.306  Yet, in the 
                                                          
 299.  AMATO ET AL., supra note 177, at 124 (describing tensions related to gender roles). 
 300.  Id. at 173. 
 301.  Id. at 174. 
 302.  Sarah Jane Glynn, The New Breadwinners, 2010 Update, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 
16, 2012), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/labor/report/2012/04/16/11377/the-new-
breadwinners-2010-update/.  
 303.  KATHLEEN GERSON, THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: COMING OF AGE IN A NEW ERA OF 
GENDER, WORK, AND FAMILY 11 (2010) (indicating that four-fifths of women and two-thirds of 
men surveyed indicate that they want egalitarian relationships); id. at 172 (noting that even self-
reliant women are reluctant to shoulder the entire economic burden on their own). 
 304.  While the majority of all women say that they want egalitarian relationships, middle class 
women are more likely to choose a traditional relationship as an alternative while working women 
pick self-reliance as an alternative.  Id. at 127.   
 305.  Sharon H. Bzostek, Sara McLanahan & Marcia J. Carlson, Mothers’ Repartnering After a 
Nonmarital Birth, 90 SOC. FORCES 817 (2012). 
 306.  See supra notes 13, 19–30 and accompanying text.  
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context of custodial arrangements, the parent who invests more in the chil-
dren has the ability to end the relationship and keep sole custody largely to 
the degree she stays out of court.307 
Although in most states the law does not draw a distinction between the 
custodial rights of married and unmarried parents, married fathers are much 
more likely to have a custodial order after dissolution of their marriage than 
unmarried fathers.308  The reasons are practical.  For married parents, pater-
nity establishment is automatic; for the unmarried, a second parent must opt 
into parenthood.309  For married parents who divorce, child support and cus-
todial orders are routine; for unmarried parents, there is no dissolution pro-
ceeding in which to seek an order, so they must file a separate action.310  Even 
for married parents, the likelihood that a father has a custodial order corre-
lates with his income.311  Unmarried parents tend to be poorer, and the re-
ported contested custody cases, which are not necessarily typical of unmar-
ried cases overall, tend to involve men who have more resources than average 
for unmarried fathers and more resources than the mothers involved in the 
litigation.312  Most unmarried couples prefer not to go to court or are unable 
to do so—instead, they work things out informally.313 
Staying out of court, whether for Lee and Michelle, or working class 
couples who have had a child together, leaves the stronger party in a position 
to call the shots.  In palimony cases, that has historically meant that wealthier 
men paired with women without comparable resources have greater bargain-
ing power when ending the relationship.  In the case of children, it ratifies the 
practices in poorer communities where women tend to take primary respon-
sibility for children.314  In both cases, however, it reinforces norms that iden-
tify nonmarriage as having greater inequality than the law allows in mar-
riage.315 
Marriage and nonmarriage are thus fundamentally different systems.  
For centuries, the law has been comprehensively involved in establishing 
marriage as an institution and guiding changes in the nature of the institution 
                                                          
 307.  Carbone & Cahn, supra note 151, at 1211–12. 
 308.  See BROWN & COOK, supra note 141, at 30 (finding that married fathers are much more 
likely to have custodial orders). 
 309.  See supra notes 113–115 and accompanying text. 
 310.  See Brustin & Martin, supra note 115, at 813–14 (describing process). 
 311.  See BROWN & COOK, supra note 141, at 19. 
 312.  See, e.g., supra, cases discussed in Part I in which the father has married someone else, but 
mother has not.  
 313.  See Harris, supra note 255, at 166 (describing informal arrangements). 
 314.  See EDIN & NELSON, supra note 151, at 214 (describing mothers in poor communities as 
gatekeepers). 
 315.  See, e.g., Lane v. Lane, 202 S.W.3d 577 (Ky.  2006) (disapproving provision of premarital 
agreement between a wealthy stockbroker and a hotel clerk on unconscionability grounds); Barbara 
A. Atwood & Brian H. Bix, A New Uniform Law for Premarital and Marital Agreements, 46 FAM. 
L.Q. 313, 318 (2012) (“marriage gives rise to fiduciary duties between spouses”). 
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as society changes.  Nonmarriage, in contrast, has developed largely outside 
the law, reinforcing the differences between the two systems.  First, with 
married couples, the law typically insists on upholding the core normative 
commitments involved in the formal system of marriage while encouraging 
alternative dispute resolution that creates space for private agreements.316  
With nonmarriage, the parties in less formal relationships may find it easier 
to avoid contact with the legal system altogether,317 but they may have greater 
difficulty enforcing individualized understandings when they end up in 
court.318 
Second, the emerging law of nonmarriage recognizes the contingent na-
ture of nonmarital relationships when it comes to financial matters but ig-
nores it with respect to children.  As a result, while the formal law that gov-
erns financial matters corresponds to informal nonmarital practices, the law 
that governs children does not. 
Third, the legal treatment of parental rights and responsibilities contin-
ues to follow the all-or-nothing approach typical of marital relationships.  
Marriage, both historically and today, is a system designed to unite two par-
ents in the creation of a unitary family.319  Nonmarriage, by contrast, involves 
a continuum of relationships that may not necessarily involve the equal as-
sumption of parental obligations.  Yet, where the law recognizes two legal 
parents, it tends to confer equal standing on them irrespective of the realities 
of the families they have created. 
Taken together, therefore, existing nonmarriage law320 does not system-
atically reflect or do justice to the reasons underlying partners’ decisions not 
to marry each other and community norms about such relationships. 
                                                          
 316.  See Singer, supra note 243. 
 317.  Carbone & Cahn, supra note 151, at 1189. 
 318.  This may be true both because of the lack of systematic access to alternative dispute reso-
lution and because of the legal system’s lack of recognition of or sympathy for the circumstances 
of the unmarried.  See Hatcher, supra note 149, at 908–09.   
 319.  See Dolgin, supra note 87, at 667 n.118 (1993) (discussing the idea of the “unitary family” 
in the Supreme Court’s treatment of parentage). 
 320.  The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, which establishes procedures for binding prenup-
tial agreements concerning issues such as the accumulation of property during marriage, has been 
adopted in almost half of American jurisdictions.  UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE FACT 
SHEET—PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT (2016), http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFact-
Sheet.aspx?title=Premarital%20Agreement%20Act.  A successor act, the Uniform Premarital and 
Marital Agreements Act, which was completed in 2012, has been adopted in two jurisdictions.  
UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE FACT SHEET—PREMARITAL AND MARITAL 
AGREEMENTS ACT (2016), http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Premari-
tal%20and%20Marital%20Agreements%20Act.   
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IV.  NONMARRIAGE AND AUTONOMY 
Moving forward, nonmarriage should be seen as a legal category in its 
own right.  Rather than dividing the law of nonmarriage into separate cate-
gories that deal with financial matters, child support, and child custody, the 
legal system should make greater efforts to treat these relationships as part of 
an integrated whole and to equip couples with greater ability to reach resolu-
tions on their own.321  At the same time, this also requires recognition that 
nonmarital relationships do not rest on a single set of culturally assumed (and 
often imposed) assumptions.  Instead, they occupy a continuum that includes 
couples who have made an express decision not to marry, couples who 
thought that they were in a committed relationship and feel betrayed by the 
break-up, and others who formed contingent relationships that intentionally 
left open the future of the relationship.  Doing justice to these relationships 
accordingly requires, first, embracing couples’ autonomy in creating nonmar-
ital relationships and giving them more tools for crafting express agreements, 
particularly with respect to financial matters.  Second, it requires recasting 
parenting relationships.  Unmarried parenting does not necessarily involve 
an impoverished mother and a father who has abandoned his children, but it 
sometimes involves a betrayal of trust.322  Parents should have greater ability 
to craft agreements that reflect the realities of individual relationships, and 
the default norms that apply should not necessarily be the same as the ones 
that govern married relationships.  This Article proposes that any legal re-
gime should ensure enforcement of the parties’ own understandings of their 
relationship and responsibilities, and more fully integrate alternative dispute 
resolution techniques into the treatment of unmarried relationships.  These 
principles of autonomy can resolve the fundamental contradiction in the con-
temporary approaches to nonmarriage. 
A.  Autonomy and Nonmarriage 
Nonmarriage has long had a bad name, if it is given a printable name at 
all.  It has historically been associated with women’s lack of virtue and men’s 
refusal to take responsibility for their partners and their children; it has also 
stood for the law’s refusal to permit the creation of intimate nonmarital rela-
tionships.323  Today, however, nonmarriage has emerged as a choice; one that 
                                                          
 321.  For arguments on how the state can better support families, see, for example, MAXINE 
EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEALS 
(2010); LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND 
RESPONSIBILITY (2006); Lenhardt, supra note 232, at 1348–52. 
 322.  On the role of infidelity as a cause of the dissolution of nonmarital relationships, see, for 
example, EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 281, at 81 (covering infidelity and domestic violence); Hill, 
supra note 282, at 104; Reed, supra note 282, at 133. 
 323.  See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 119 (1976) (observing that earlier decisions 
“rested upon a policy of punishing persons guilty of cohabitation without marriage”). 
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exists for couples who want to create their own relationships on their own 
terms.  While unmarried partners differ on what they want in their relation-
ships, with, for example, one partner sometimes preferring more commitment 
than the other, they both realize that the decision not to marry means that 
their relationship will not be the same as a marital one.  These choices should 
receive legal respect. 
To do so requires starting with the idea of obligation.  Men have histor-
ically been seen as responsible for women for two reasons, both of which are 
no longer true.  The first was legal restrictions on women’s labor market par-
ticipation and capacity for self-support, making women—women with chil-
dren, in particular—dependent on male support.  Today, in contrast, the legal 
restrictions no longer exist.324  The second was the practical inability to en-
gage in sexual activity without the risk of pregnancy.  Therefore, sex had to 
be confined within a relationship that could deal with the consequences.  As 
both of these conditions have changed, so has the meaning of decisions not 
to marry.  The cases that address finances reflect these changes in the vulner-
ability of women and the corresponding understanding that attends sexual 
partnerships,325 but the child support cases do not.  What both require is a 
different model of nonmarital decisionmaking, within a different normative 
framework. 
In the case of financial decisions, the law has embraced the parties’ 
agreements—or lack thereof.  In Marvin, Lee and Michelle’s relationship was 
a traditional one. They both treated Michelle as dependent on Lee during the 
relationship.326  While they differed in their descriptions of their agreement, 
they seemed clear in describing a relationship in which Michelle wanted a 
marriage-like set of arrangements and Lee refused to commit to her. Their 
relationship ended, after all, when Lee left her to marry his high school sweet-
heart.327  In more recent cases, by contrast, it may be a woman who refuses 
to make a permanent financial commitment to a less well-off partner—a part-
ner who might prefer to marry.328  As both men and women make choices to 
                                                          
 324. The wage gap has narrowed, particularly for those with less education, and women’s work-
force participation is close to men’s, even though women still earn less than men.  See, e.g., Fancine 
D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends, and Explanations 3 (IZA 
Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 9656, 2016), http://ftp.iza.org/dp9656.pdf; Ben 
Casselman, Why Women Are No Longer Catching up to Men on Pay, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 19, 
2016, 7:00 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-women-are-no-longer-catching-up-to-
men-on-pay/. 
 325.  See Akerlof et al., supra note 154, at 298.   
 326.  See Marvin, 557 P.2d at 110.  
 327.  See Elaine Woo, Michelle Triola Marvin Dies at 75; Her Legal Fight with Ex-lover Lee 
Marvin Added “Palimony” to the Language, L.A. TIMES (October 31, 2009), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/obituaries/la-me-michelle-triola-marvin31-2009oct31-story.html 
(noting that Lee Marvin married his high school sweetheart after leaving Michelle).  
 328.  See, e.g., Simmons v. Samulewicz, 304 P.3d 648 (Haw. Ct. App. 2013); see also supra 
notes 56–59 and accompanying text (discussing a modern case in which the female partner broke 
off an engagement with a male partner because of his shaky finances); CARBONE & CAHN, supra 
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live together without marrying, the law no longer passes judgment on them, 
even when the result reflects unequal bargaining power and different prefer-
ences.  These couples are treated as independent actors capable of making 
their own choices and dealing the consequences. 
In contrast, child support law is paradoxically based on an image of 
deadbeat dads deserting their children329 and who need to be coerced into 
assuming marriage-like responsibilities.  The assumptions underlying child 
support provisions have been that, first, all parents should support their chil-
dren, second, mothers would not need government assistance if the fathers 
provided adequate support, and third, fathers either married the mothers of 
their children or abandoned them.330  Recent research, however, has remade 
these notions.  It establishes that many of fathers who fail to provide enough 
support to keep the mothers off government assistance are “dead broke”331 
rather than deadbeats; that is, they are the kind of father from whom you 
cannot get cash because they do not have any.332  In addition, there has been 
growing recognition that unmarried fathers do contribute; the majority are 
living with the mothers at the time of the child’s birth333 and most remain 
involved with their children after their relationship with the mother ends.334  
                                                          
note 79, at 2–3; ROSIN, supra note 290, at 1–5 (story of Bethenny who did not want a partner who 
could not contribute financially); Jacquelyn J. Benson & Marilyn Coleman, Older Adults Develop-
ing a Preference for Living Apart Together, 78 J. MARR. & FAM. 797, 803 (2016).  In Living Apart 
Together, one study participant explained her reason not to get married: “if Eli and I got married 
now, what happens if he goes into a nursing home and if suddenly my assets are his assets because 
we’re married and it sucks it all away, and the money that I intended for my nursing home is now 
gone?  Or if I managed to have assets still intact at the time of my death, it would go to my son.  
What if I’m married?  No, then it goes to the partner.”  Id.  
 329.  See, e.g., Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support 
Enforcement, and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 325, 353 (2005) (noting that the 
idea of a “[d]eadbeat Dad” “evokes an image of a noncustodial father who has impoverished his 
children while improving his own standard of living after separation from the family”). 
 330.  See, e.g., Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Distrust, 91 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 757, 793 (2015) (the logic of child support enforcement efforts was that “an available father” 
rather than the government should support the child); Brenda Cossman, Contesting Conservatisms, 
Family Feuds and the Privatization of Dependency, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 415, 
443 (2005) (explaining that both liberals and conservatives saw “‘deadbeat dads’ as culpable for 
their children’s poverty and welfare dependency, and . . . [sought] to promote personal responsibil-
ity by enforcing the private support obligations of fathers”). 
 331.  See, e.g., Maldonado, supra note 143, at 1001, 1004 (2006) (describing poor fathers as too 
broke to be able to pay the amounts specified in child support orders). 
 332.  See Tonya L. Brito, Fathers Behind Bars: Rethinking Child Support Policy Toward Low-
Income Noncustodial Fathers and Their Families, 15 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 617, 633 (2012). 
 333.  See Harris, supra note 255, at 166 (“The Fragile Families research found that the great 
majority of unmarried parents are strongly connected to each other and to their children at birth. At 
the time of birth, 51% of unmarried couples in the study were living together, and another 31% were 
dating.”). 
 334.  Among nonresident fathers in the Fragile Families Study who were interviewed one year 
after the birth of their children, 87% had seen their child since birth and 63% had seen their child 
more than once in the past month.  By the interview three years after birth, 71% had seen their child 
since the first-year interview, and 47% had seen their child more than once in the past month.  At 
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The parents, left to their own devices, trade off support and access to the 
child, often without the intervention of the legal system. More than fifty-
seven percent of custodial parents, for example, received noncash support 
from noncustodial parents, a type of support court orders do not address.335  
And, while custodial parents are portrayed as “gatekeepers”336 who block the 
noncustodial parents’ access to children, the majority of fathers, in fact, have 
access to their children following a break-up.337  In many of these cases, the 
parents simply see no reason to formalize their relationship.  For example, 
among custodial parents without child support orders involving the other par-
ent, the custodial parent did not seek such an order in two-thirds of cases 
either because the other parent was already contributing or because of the 
lack of a desire to have court involvement.338 
Some of these cases certainly involved absent parents who could con-
tribute and refused to do so after the break-up, or custodial parents eager to 
move on to new relationships who excluded a parent willing to pay support, 
but these parents were a distinct minority.339  In the majority of cases, unmar-
ried parents, like other unmarried partners, negotiate an arrangement without 
resorting to the legal system.340  In these negotiations, custodial parents seek 
to secure their own and their children’s safety from violent or abusive part-
ners, their ability to form new relationships without interference, resources 
                                                          
the interview five years after birth, 63% had seen their child since the third-year interview, and 43% 
had seen their child more than once in the past month.  Black non-Hispanic men were more likely 
to have maintained contact with their children, to have seen them in the past month, and to have 
seen them frequently.  Marcia J. Carlson et al., Coparenting and Nonresident Fathers’ Involvement 
with Young Children After a Nonmarital Birth, 45 DEMOGRAPHY 461, 473 (2008). 
 335.  Harris, supra note 255, at 169–70 (stating that “[w]hen parents in the Fragile Families 
study split up after the birth of a child, most of the men who were not living with the mothers still 
stayed in contact with their children, at least in the first few years”).  
 336.  See EDIN & NELSON, supra note 151, at 157, 169, 208, 214; see Huntington, supra note 
16, at 240. 
 337.  Harris, supra note 255.  
 338.  TIMOTHY S. GRALL, CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND FATHERS AND THEIR CHILD SUPPORT: 
2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p60-240.pdf.  In other 
cases, however, the custodial parent did not want contact with the other parent, with 16.7% reporting 
that they did not seek a child support order because they did not want the child to have contact with 
the other parent, in 21.2% of the cases because they did not want the other parent to pay for unspec-
ified reasons, and in 16.7% of the cases because the other parent could not be located.  Id. at 7.  On 
the issue of court involvement, see Carbone & Cahn, supra note 151, at 1224–25.   
 339.  Huntington, supra note 16, at 195 (observing that “[t]o maintain the new relationship, it 
was easiest for the mother to keep the father away from the family”). 
 340.  Indeed, those who object to “gatekeeping” define it as the ability of custodial parents to set 
terms for noncustodial access to children, contrasting it with court orders that give the noncustodial 
parents access as a matter of legal right.  Id.  Such court orders, however, give the custodial parents 
little ability to insist on terms that protect either the custodial parent’s or the children’s interests.  
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with which to provide for the family, and cooperation in establishing parent-
ing norms.341 
The legal regulation of these relationships ought to be more like that of 
cohabitants in financial disputes; it should respect independent actors who 
manage their own relationship terms.  At divorce, parents do in fact often 
manage to agree on parenting terms that involve trades of support for more 
or less time with the child.  Unmarried parents effect similar exchanges with-
out going to court.342  The fact that both the process and content of such 
agreements between unmarried parents may differ from those of married par-
ents is not itself cause for concern.  Instead, the issue ought to be how the law 
can interact with these couples to strengthen their ability to reach resolutions 
consistent with the varied understandings that underlie their relationships. 
B.  Nonmarriage, Finances, and Private Ordering 
Recognition of nonmarriage as its own legal status should give unmar-
ried couples far more control of their financial relationships, both in the con-
text of bank accounts and child support.  That additional control could hap-
pen, for example, in a series of different situations.  First, true recognition of 
nonmarriage should make it easier for parties to select and enforce the terms 
of the relationship of their choice.  This means courts should enforce formal 
contracts, when they exist, as well as when partners opt into other forms of 
legal recognition of their relationships.343  In the absence of such formalities, 
the law should apply presumptions that recognize how the partners live 
through their relationships.  In accordance with this principle, the courts 
should presume that the parties expect to remain financially independent, 
they expect to receive credit for contributions to the acquisition of major fi-
nancial assets such as a house, and they do not anticipate tallying up contri-
butions for routine day-to-day expenses such as groceries in the absence of 
an express agreement and record keeping that would make such an account-
ing fair and practical.  Financial professionals should assist.  The purchase of 
a home or a car or the opening of a bank account is a formal event, with 
opportunities to think about how to take title, and to establish a record that 
reflects the parties’ respective contributions.  In contrast, there should be no 
expectation of financial obligations arising from informal day-to-day ex-
changes. 
                                                          
 341.  For poor unmarried women, domestic violence is a factor in the majority of break-ups, and 
distrust between the parents often means a lack of confidence in the other parent’s parenting skills.  
See supra notes 281–282 and accompanying text.  
 342.  See Huntington, supra note 16, at 195. 
 343.  Twenty-six percent of lawyers in the American Association of Matrimonial Law report 
increased interest in cohabitation agreements.  Joslin Davis, Avoiding a Costly Cohabitation Di-
vorce, HUFF. POST (June 2, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joslin-davis/avoiding-a-costly-
cohabit_b_10261306.html.   
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Second, child support could similarly be treated to allow parents to im-
plement child support agreements to a greater degree.  While the state has a 
strong—and legally enforceable—interest in the welfare of the child, the pre-
sumption is that parents are best able to effectuate those interests.344  Conse-
quently, mandatory child support actions might be limited to a narrower 
range of cases where the noncustodial parent has proven ability to pay and 
the custodial parent is otherwise destitute.345  Extending mandatory actions, 
that is, a requirement to facilitate state-initiated actions as a condition of the 
receipt of benefits such as health insurance, is a major violation of parental 
autonomy.346 
Moreover, where the state initiates an action, the parent should retain 
control of it, including the ability to reach a settlement.347  Instead of being 
forced into court, parents could receive access to community-based media-
tion services in resolving their disputes.348  The goal becomes assisting par-
ents in reaching their own resolutions based on their assessments of their own 
capabilities and their children’s interests rather than imposing conditions 
from outside based on a simplistic notion of equality. 
                                                          
 344.   See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000). 
 345.  See Stacy Brustin, Child Support: Shifting the Financial Burden in Low-Income Families, 
20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 4–5 (2012) (summarizing proposed reforms).  
 346.  Consider, for example, a hypothetical unmarried couple that separated before the birth of 
their child.  In one version of the hypothetical, the noncustodial parent sees the child regularly and 
contributes often.  In a second version, the parents agree that the noncustodial parent will not be 
part of the child’s life in any way.  In neither case is there a child support order, and all of the parents 
want it that way.  When the child is four, each custodial parent’s employer decides to discontinue 
health insurance for its employees, and the custodial parent obtains an insurance policy through the 
expanded Medicaid system.  If the custodial parent’s income is low enough to qualify for subsidies 
under the Act, that parent becomes obligated to cooperate in state efforts to obtain child support 
from the noncustodial parent to offset the cost of the government provided insurance subsidy.  In 
contrast, if the custodial parent’s employer provides health care, subsidized through the tax system, 
there is no such obligation even if the size of the government subsidy for the employer-provided 
insurance is larger than the subsidy through the Medicaid system.  See CARMEN SOLOMON-FEARS, 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, MEDICAL CHILD SUPPORT: BACKGROUND AND CURRENT 
POLICY 13 (2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43020.pdf. 
 347.  In many states, child support guidelines take into account the amount of time the child 
spends with the other parent, so that if the parents were to reach a settlement that included custodial 
time with both parents, it would be automatically reflected in the child support award.  In state-
initiated actions, however, the noncustodial parents cannot seek a custody order—that can only be 
done in a separate action.  Some have suggested changing the law to combine the two actions, but 
doing so would simply combine an inflexible child support system with an inflexible custody system 
that mandates two parent involvement.  See Brustin & Martin, supra note 115 (critiquing such pro-
posals). 
 348.  See id. at 844–45 (arguing that mediation or other forms of alternative dispute resolution 
may offer promising methods for addressing interrelated issues of visitation and custody in parent-
age and child support cases).  
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C.  Nonmarriage, Parenthood, and Private Ordering 
Principles of autonomy allow those who reject the implicit and explicit 
terms of marriage to fashion relationships on other terms.349  At one time, 
when the law told gay and lesbian couples that they could not marry, they 
fought for and often obtained recognition as parents outside of marriage.  
They won recognition of second-parent adoption, stepparent adoption within 
civil unions and domestic partnerships, de facto parentage, and other forms 
of functional parenthood.350  Today, with access to marriage, the question 
becomes whether these doctrines will retain their vitality—for different-sex 
and same-sex couples alike. 
This Section maintains that recognition of the parental status and custo-
dial rights of those who do not marry should respect the parents’ autonomy 
in choosing to enter into any number of different parenting arrangements and 
acknowledge the relationship between the practicalities of children’s interests 
and the nature of the adult arrangements.  Only those adults who have as-
sumed an equal commitment to the child should be presumed to be capable 
of vindicating an equal assignment of custodial responsibilities. 
While equal assumption of parental responsibilities has become the 
norm associated with marriage and child rearing in middle class communities 
that bear children within marriage, it is not the norm in the communities mov-
ing away from marriage.  Women may not marry precisely because they find 
the men unstable as partners and potential parents.351  Instead, in these com-
munities, unmarried fathers’ relationships with their children occur in the 
context of the contingent relationships they negotiate with the mothers, and 
studies indicate that a father’s continuing relationship with his children de-
pends on how he manages the relationship with the mother.352  The access to 
the child that the mother allows often depends in turn on the father’s willing-
ness to cooperate with the mother and assist financially and socially when 
she needs help.353  And women encourage the greater involvement of the men 
                                                          
 349.  See supra at Part III.A. 
 350.  See, e.g., NeJaime, supra note 72, at 1197, 1199. 
 351.  See, e.g., Amber Lapp, How Class Influences Pregnancy Ambivalence, INSTITUTE FOR 
FAMILY STUDIES (Apr. 27, 2015), http://family-studies.org/how-class-influences-pregnancy-am-
bivalence/; David Lapp, Could Pregnancy be a Reason NOT to Get Married?, http://twentysome-
thingmarriage.org/could-pregnancy-be-a-reason-not-to-get-married/. 
 352.  The mother’s entry into new relationships also has an impact.  See Tach & Edin, supra note 
280, at 1794.  There are racial variations in the rate of positive co-parenting, with black mothers 
reporting higher rates of effective co-parenting and more involvement from black fathers than other 
races.  See Calvina Z. Ellerbe et al., Nonresident Fathers’ Involvement After a Nonmarital Birth: 
Exploring Differences by Race/Ethnicity 9–10, 20, 22 (Bendheim-Thoman Ctr. for Research on 
Child Wellbeing, Working Paper WP14-07-FF, 2014), http://crcw.princeton.edu/publications/pub-
lications.asp. 
 353.  See NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 3 (2000); Harris, supra note 313.  Soci-
ologists have found that the mothers valued fathers’ contributions not by the amount of financial 
support, but by non-economic factors, such as role modeling.  See, e.g., Maureen R. Waller, Viewing 
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who contribute to their children, either financially or otherwise, and often 
form new relationships when the father does not remain involved.354  Given 
the factors that undermine relationship stability in poorer communities, a 
norm that counsels hesitation about marriage and about truly shared parent-
ing makes sense.355  Children’s interests are best served through family sta-
bility, regardless of family structure,356 and mandating two-parent involve-
ment in the face of violence, conflict, or unpredictability undermines that 
stability. 
Therefore, it makes no sense to insist on formal equality between the 
married and the unmarried in custody proceedings.  Existing law, of course, 
permits consideration of factors such as domestic violence,357 and substance 
abuse, criminality, and incarceration are grounds to limit parental contact 
even among married couples.  Yet, in the face of clear statutory mandates to 
take parental misbehavior into account, courts have difficulty determining 
when factors such as domestic violence and substance abuse are serious 
enough to justify limitations on custodial rights, and they appear reluctant to 
limit a parent’s contact with a child in the face of a strong presumption for 
the continuation of such contact.358 
Instead, the courts should recognize that the reasons parents do not 
marry are often good reasons not to award shared custody.  Recognition of 
these reasons should give rise to presumptions that track the behavior that 
leads some into marriage and some into nonmarriage, with recognition that 
                                                          
Low-Income Fathers’ Ties to Families Through a Cultural Lens: Insights for Research and Policy, 
629 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 102, 109 (2010). 
 354.  Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of Paternity Law and 
Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 37 (2004); Laurie S. Kohn, Engaging Men as 
Fathers: The Courts, the Law, and Father Absence in Low-Income Families, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 
511, 512 (2013).  Men are also more likely to establish paternity if they have a close relationship 
with the mother.  See Ronald Mincy et al., In-Hospital Paternity Establishment and Father Involve-
ment in Fragile Families, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 611, 615 (2005).  A smaller Wisconsin study 
found that almost half of the unmarried parents in the state filed voluntary paternity acknowledge-
ments (“VPAs”) within a few months of birth for children born in 2005.  The parents were more 
likely to use VPAs if they were older or college educated, and less likely to do so if the mother was 
on receiving public support.  See BROWN & COOK, supra note 141.  
 355.  What produces this distrust is not just economic marginality, but the mismatch between 
men and women.  See CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 79.   
 356.  See, e.g., SEAN FREMSTAD & MELISSA BOTEACH, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, VALUING 
ALL OUR FAMILIES 16 (2015), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Fam-
ilyStructure-report.pdf; Ariel Kalil et al., Time Investments in Children Across Family Structures, 
654 ANNALS AM. ACAD.  POL. & SOC. SCI. 150 (2014). 
 357.  See Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law 2011–2012: 
“DOMA” Challenges Hit Federal Courts and Abduction Cases Increase, 46 FAM. L.Q. 471, 524 
(2013) (custody criteria). 
 358.  Scott & Emery, supra note 120, at 70–71. 
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the presumptions should be rebuttable in appropriate cases.359  Such an alter-
native system would not disturb existing law applicable to married parents 
who otherwise meet the jurisdiction’s criteria for shared custody.360  For un-
married parents, however, the law should assume that the children’s interests 
lie in the security and stability of their attachment to the person who has acted 
as their primary caretaker, unless there are two adults who: 
 a) are both legal parents in accordance with the opt-in system described 
above361;  
b) can demonstrate the capacity to parent together without violence, 
abuse, or excessive conflict; and, 
c) have lived together for a period of at least two years during which 
they shared parenting; or, 
d) have shared parenting in an approximately equal way for a period of 
at least two years without living together. 
If the presumption in favor of a single primary custodial parent is not 
rebutted, the other parent would still be able to seek visitation in accordance 
with a best interest standard.  While the presumption would be that the child’s 
interests lie with visitation, the presumption should include the consideration 
that the child’s interests lie with the strength of the relationship to the primary 
caretaker.362 
The resulting new framework363 articulates distinct standards for cus-
tody based on whether the parents have explicitly or implicitly assumed joint 
                                                          
 359.  As Scott and Scott recognize, “cohabiting couples are a heterogeneous category with di-
verse goals and expectations for their relationships.  This heterogeneity, together with the defining 
decision not to marry, . . . sends a confusing signal about the nature of cohabiting unions.”  Scott & 
Scott, supra note 9, at 299–300. 
 360.  A full examination of the propriety of shared custody at divorce is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  Yet, as discussed in Part II.A.2, supra, the same factors that counsel hesitation in the case 
of unmarried couples, such as the failure to live together, to assume co-equal responsibility for the 
child at birth, or to engage in violence, criminal behavior, or high levels of conflict, should also 
rebut any presumption in favor of joint or shared custody at divorce. 
 361.  Today, most different-sex cohabitants sign voluntary acknowledgments of paternity.  Har-
ris, supra note 102, at 1308–13.  Same-sex couples would similarly have to take action, such as 
adoption, for the partner who is not biologically related to the child to receive recognition as a 
parent.  Many states, however, also consider functional parenthood either as a basis for full parental 
status or as a basis for visitation in accordance with a best interest test. 
 362.  This means, as a practical matter, that where two parents cannot cooperate, the burden 
should not be on the custodial parent to insure the inclusion of the other parent in the child’s life.  
For disturbing examples of the opposite rule, see K.T.D. v. K.W.P, 119 So. 3d 418, 430–31 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 2012) (transferring custody of a five-year-old child from sole maternal custody to joint 
legal and physical custody because of the mother’s failure to support the father’s involvement); 
Sharp v. Keeler, 256 S.W.3d 528, 539 (Ark. App. 2007) (transferring custody of seriously ill child 
to father who had had only limited visitation with the child because of acrimony between the par-
ents).  In both cases, the courts valued contact with the non-custodial parent more than the child’s 
interest in the relationship with the custodial parent who had provided care from birth.  
 363.  Since 1986, Massachusetts has used two different standards for determining custody.  First, 
for nonmarital parents, “the court shall, to the extent possible, preserve the relationship between the 
child and the primary caretaker parent,” considering where the child has resided “and whether one 
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responsibility for caretaking in the context of a stable, long-term relationship.  
Such a system is consistent with emerging norms that draw sharp (and evolv-
ing) distinctions between marital and nonmarital parenting partnerships, and 
which focus on the child’s interests in the stability of a relationship with the 
parent or parents who have consistently provided caretaking and who have 
taken care of the child emotionally and financially—irrespective of mar-
riage.364  By ratifying the arrangements that families are developing them-
selves, it reflects Obergefell’s joint emphasis on equality and autonomy, al-
lowing couples to make the choice between an opt-in or an opt-out system. 
D.  Objections 
To be sure, such a system, which draws a bright-line rule based on mar-
riage and gives custodial parents (who tend to be women) greater rights than 
non-custodial parents, is likely to be controversial for several reasons.  First, 
it may appear to promote marriage at the expense of other institutions.  That 
is, it may be viewed as providing rights that are contingent upon marriage, 
thus continuing the privileging of marital status. 
The system, however, does not valorize marriage to the exclusion of 
nonmarriage.  Instead, it tries to honor the reasons that couples might choose 
one arrangement over the other.365  The argument for this new system of reg-
ulating nonmarriage rests on the recognition that marriage has become a dis-
tinct—rather than universal—bargain, and that nonmarriage is becoming a 
separate and robust family structure on its own.  Marriage encourages a joint 
assumption of responsibility for finances and for children.  In return, it pro-
tects the investment both partners make in the relationship itself and that they 
make in the children.  The result makes marriage riskier in some ways for 
parents who fear losing custody, but it also encourages greater care in the 
                                                          
or both of the parents has established a personal and parental relationship with the child or has 
exercised parental responsibility in the best interests of the child.”  MASS. GEN. LAWS 209C § 10 
(2015); see, e.g., Smith v. McDonald, 941 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Mass. 2010) (holding that a nonmarital 
father had no legal rights prior to paternity establishment, but that once established, visitation was 
appropriate).  Second, for married parents, their rights “shall, in the absence of misconduct, be held 
to be equal . . . until a judgment on the merits is rendered, absent emergency conditions, abuse or 
neglect, the parents shall have temporary shared legal custody of any minor child of the marriage.”  
MASS. GEN. LAWS. 208 § 31 (2015).  Other states do not distinguish in their custody statutes be-
tween marital and nonmarital parents.  E.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2015). 
 364.  The ALI’s system of proportional custody could be justified in similar terms.  See Scott & 
Emery, supra note 120, at 75.  The system proposed in this Article is different in that it distinguishes 
between marital and nonmarital children, and it assumes there should be a single primary caretaker 
who receives sole custody except where the parents demonstrate that they have jointly assumed 
caretaking responsibility in a manner similar to long-term, committed cohabitants.  To be sure, most 
nonmarital children are born to cohabitants, but the cohabitation is less likely to be stable, co-equal, 
or long-lasting.  See MCLANAHAN ET AL., supra note 288.   
 365.  See, e.g., Erez Aloni, Deprivative Recognition, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1276, 1285 (discussing 
“the potential financial benefits of nonrecognition”); Matsumura, supra note 233, at 1515 (explain-
ing that people may not marry because of “legal consequence and personal beliefs”). 
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selection of a partner.  Recognizing nonmarriage as a legitimate system on 
its own terms requires acknowledging the different patterns of commitment 
between adults and to children.  This Article attempts to identify the traits 
that link marriage and shared parenting, and it extends them to unmarried 
couples who demonstrate the same traits, but only to those couples.366 
Second, the system may, in the guise of acknowledging existing bar-
gains, mischaracterize nonmarital relationships as more contingent and risk-
ier than they are in practice.367  The Fragile Families studies, for example, 
demonstrate that the majority of nonmarital fathers cohabit with the mothers 
of their children at birth, and contribute substantially to them materially and 
emotionally.368  Failing to grant these fathers equal standing with married 
fathers may thus be perceived as further entrenching the class-based differ-
ences between families; deepening the differences between low-income fam-
ilies (which are more likely to be nonmarital) and everyone else; and discour-
aging low-income fathers from further involvement.  The state should, 
indeed, be wary of reifying this situation.  Moreover, the existing system al-
ready discourages paternal investment in children.  State-initiated child sup-
port enforcement results in high incarceration rates that, by themselves, have 
counterproductive effects on fathers’ involvement with their children’s 
lives.369  The increased emphasis on paternal custodial rights has encouraged 
some women to forego child support, so that they will not be subject to fa-
thers’ efforts to control their lives through their children.370 
Nonetheless, while government regulation should encourage the in-
volvement of parents with their children, the means for doing so should not 
disrupt a child’s stable environment and the ability of the primary caretaker 
to continue providing care.371  Rather than removing family decisionmaking 
                                                          
 366.  This Article also accepts the possibility of alternative family patterns with one or more 
parents.  To date, the interests of third parties, such as biological fathers, have been seen as at odds 
with recognition of same-sex partners, but accepting the notion that not all parents have the same 
rights makes it easier to conceive of more than two parents.  See, e.g., ERTMAN, supra note 229; 
NeJaime, supra note 72. 
 367.  See CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY 
RELATIONSHIPS 100 (2014). 
 368.  See supra notes 333–335. 
 369.  See, e.g., Noah D. Zatz, A New Peonage?: Pay, Work, or Go to Jail in Contemporary Child 
Support Enforcement and Beyond, 39 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 927 (reporting that fifteen percent of 
African American fathers in large cities have been imprisoned at some point for not paying child 
support).   
 370.  Carbone & Cahn, supra note 151 (describing the motives of custodial parents who do not 
seek child support orders); Harris, supra note 313. 
 371.  Moreover, the legal default rules that operate in the background often affect the terms of 
parental bargains.  In the cases that have given rise to changes in custody because of the failure of 
one parent to cooperate with the other, the courts assume that shared custody should be the norm 
and that the child’s interests lie with the involvement of both parents.  In these cases, the reason for 
the custodial parent’s refusal to cooperate with the noncustodial may be irrelevant; the courts appear 
determined to produce two party involvement, effectively punishing the custodial parents for what 
may be a mutual unwillingness of the two parents to cooperate with each other.  See, e.g., supra 
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from the parents to the state, the state should defer to the parties’ own ar-
rangements.372  Left to their own devices, non-custodial parents contribute 
more when the state does not intervene, particularly when that intervention 
comes over the objections of both parents.373  Given what we know about the 
reasons poor couples do not marry, creating a system of greater automatic 
custody rights would confer significant advantages on the parties least likely 
to cooperate.374 
In contrast, measures to address the class gap directly, rather than 
through family law, offer more promise.375  Fathers in nonmarital families 
who cannot play the role they desire are typically unable to do so because of 
their unstable living situations, ranging from periodic unemployment to in-
carceration.376  If society invested more in the fathers, rather than in efforts 
to promote marriage or shared custody, greater family stability would follow.  
In the meantime, this proposal provides stability for children, according to 
their expectations and needs.  It does not exclude non-custodial parents from 
the children’s lives, and should not stand in the way of proposals that focus 
on parenting skills and the ability to cooperate.377 
Relatedly, even for married couples, the equal parenting presumptions 
may not in fact reflect the couples’ preferred arrangement or the actual as-
sumption of responsibilities during the marriage.  Nonetheless, the meaning 
                                                          
notes 134–138 (describing cases in which the courts transferred custody from the mother to the 
father because of the parents’ inability to cooperate).  If, on the other hand, the noncustodial parent’s 
access to the child depends on the custodial partner’s consent, the noncustodial parent would have 
a greater incentive to provide support or to engage in more cooperative behavior as the understood 
price of access to the child.  See, e.g., EDIN & NELSON, supra note 151, at 214 (describing mothers 
in poor communities as “gatekeepers” and describing fathers’ corresponding conviction that they 
had to keep the mothers happy to be able to see the children).  Both the courts and the fathers in the 
Edin and Nelson study express expectations that the men should want to be involved; the policy 
question we address is, on what terms? 
 372.  Proposals to extend non-custodial parents’ custody rights often accompany insistence on 
state-mandated child support enforcement, and seek to add greater custody rights as an offset to 
greater state insistence on child support enforcement.  See, e.g., Brustin & Martin, supra note 115, 
at 830; Huntington, supra note 16, at 208–09. 
 373.  See Harris, supra note 313. 
 374.  See, e.g., Amy Levin & Linda Mills, Fighting for Child Custody When Domestic Violence 
Is at Issue: Survey of State Laws, 48 SOC. WORK 463, 467 (2003) (arguing that abusers seek shared 
custody to gain access to women they abuse and those women must be free to oppose this arrange-
ment); see also Joan S. Meier, Johnson’s Differentiation Theory: Is It Really Empirically Sup-
ported?, 12 J. CHILD CUSTODY 4 (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15379418.2015.1037054 
(showing that domestic violence is a more serious issue than previously believed). 
 375.  See, e.g., CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 79; FREMSTAD & BOTEACH, supra note 356, at 
41.   
 376.  See, e.g., EDIN & NELSON, supra note 151; EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 281; ALICE 
GOFFMAN, ON THE RUN: FUGITIVE LIFE IN AN AMERICAN CITY (2014). 
 377.  See Huntington, supra note 16. 
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of marriage has come to reflect the legal assignment of equal caretaking re-
sponsibilities.  By contrast, nonmarriage presumes more varied allocations of 
caretaking responsibilities,378 and each choice deserves recognition. 
Third, making family law decisions by presumptions raises serious due 
process concerns.379  The possibility of false negatives (denying custody 
where it is warranted) and false positives (granting shared custody where it 
is unwarranted) are salient whenever the law uses presumptions.  Yet, the 
proposed unified system for financial and custodial decisionmaking does not 
impose irrebuttable presumptions.  Consequently, given the ability to rebut 
the presumption, nonmarital relationships that look like marriage should be 
treated similarly in the end.380 
Finally, on the equal protection challenge, discrimination occurs when 
“like” are treated “unlike.”  Here, the particular lens being used to classify 
becomes critical.  On the one hand, fathers with the same biological links to 
their children will be treated differently based on the fact of marriage.  On 
the other hand, fathers (and others who have functioned as parents) will be 
treated similarly if they have served as caretakers. 
While these objections suggest legitimate reasons to move cautiously 
towards further regulation of nonmarriage, they also provide insight into the 
cost-benefit analysis of legal regulation.  We cannot assume that creating a 
legal structure will simply help those who want to develop ties and allow 
those who do not to remain outside the system.  It will affect everyone. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
With the old system of marriage based on inequality now dismantled, 
the new legal regime underlying marriage involves a commitment to a joint 
assumption of responsibility for children.  Consequently, there are still major 
restraints on the ability to customize marriage; its strength as an institution 
comes from the fact it has strong norms associated with it, the most critical 
of which is childrearing.   
These new meanings for marriage create an extraordinary opportunity 
to develop a family law regime where one does not exist.  In so many other 
areas of the law, we are burdened by the encumbrances of anachronistic laws, 
but here there is the chance to create something new. 
                                                          
 378.  But see Nancy D. Polikoff, The New “Illegitimacy”: Winning Backward in the Protection 
of the Children of Lesbian Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 721, 722 (2012) (arguing 
that using marriage to recognize parental rights will decrease support for finding parentage relation-
ships in other contexts).   
 379.  See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (striking down an Alabama statute which irrefu-
tably denied alimony to husbands); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (discussing presump-
tions regarding nonmarital fathers).  
 380.  As noted earlier, this Article does not address the circumstances in which an unmarried 
partner with no biological relationship to the child should be recognized as a legal parent through 
doctrines such as de facto parenthood.  See supra note 73.   
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Nonmarriage, as a new legal status, could be conceptualized as the abil-
ity to craft custom arrangements, even if they are seemingly unequal.  That 
is, marriage is a fixed institution premised on equality with a set of clear rules, 
while nonmarriage implies the freedom to contract on a continuum of terms.  
Because the law does not impose those terms, greater autonomy is possible, 
but formal equality between parents is not mandated and may not be appro-
priate.  The law can only routinize these relationships if it acknowledges the 
reasons parents choose non-marriage over marriage, and incorporates these 
differences into both financial and custody decisionmaking.381 
The legal reality is that the nonmarital relationships discussed here—
and the nature of children’s interests that follow from the content of the adult 
relationships—are on a continuum.  Insistence on formal equality between 
the two parents and between married and unmarried parents coerces hetero-
geneous couples into homogenous relationships.  The commitment to mar-
riage presumes equal caretaking; that same presumption should only apply in 
nonmarital relationships where there is an actual assumption of equal paren-
tal responsibilities during the relationship, while the rejection of equal paren-
tal status should produce wariness about the imposition of shared custodial 
presumptions. 
Ultimately, the achievement of multiple forms of marital equality has 
created opportunities for the flourishing of nonmarital families.  This grow-
ing acceptance, however, leads to questions about how the law can respect 
these newly developing familial norms without imposing marital terms on 
the unmarried.  True respect for autonomy neither privileges marriage over 
nonmarriage nor imposes the same terms on those who have not chosen them 
voluntarily. 
                                                          
 381.  For unmarried biological parents, pressure is building to institutionalize equality in parents’ 
ongoing contact with children following dissolution of the adult relationships.  See, e.g., Huntington, 
supra note 16, at 225–31. 
